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Abstract 
 
After the official end of apartheid in South Africa, land reform was one of the 
most highly prioritized items on the new ANC government's agenda, both as a 
matter of economic restructuring and redressing past injustices. Although 
numerous land reform programs and initiatives have been implemented since 
1994, they have largely failed to reach any of the redistribution goals set forth for 
them. There is a high rate of failure among land redistribution projects, which are 
often managed by up to one hundred people. This complicated group management 
situation is necessitated by the combination of the small grant size available to 
individual applicants and the high price of agricultural land and implements. In 
addition, the grants are often contingent upon the participants’ adherence to a 
large-scale, chemically- and mechanically-intensive farm business model with 
which they have little, if any, experience. In light of the problems with the current 
land reform programs in South Africa, I assess the viability of small-hold farming 
as an alternative to the current focus on large-scale commercial farms using a 
political ecology framework. As very few small-hold redistribution projects exist, 
my project focuses on examining one such project in depth. I examine the 
economic and environmental sustainability of the farm, in addition to the level of 
satisfaction of the beneficiaries. The assessment of these factors gives an 
indication of whether land redistribution programs in South Africa could improve 
their success rates by offering the option of small-hold projects to land grant 
applicants. It also provides a narrative of the many obstacles encountered in the 
beneficiaries’ struggle to make a farm of their own—a narrative that reveals many 
shortcomings in the government’s land redistribution policies and support 
infrastructure.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
After the official end of apartheid in 1994, the new African National 
Congress (ANC) leadership was left with the enormous task of transforming the 
South African society from one of entrenched structural discrimination to one of 
racial integration and equity—a ‘Rainbow Nation’. Among the most highly 
prioritized items on the ANC’s agenda for a new South Africa has been land 
reform. Despite the fact that it comprised only 13% of the population by 1994, the 
white minority controlled roughly 85% of South Africa’s land as a result of 
centuries of legally-backed black dispossession (Thompson, 2001). Taking into 
account these disproportionate land ownership statistics, South Africa’s land 
reform process has been deemed both politically and economically necessary: 
politically necessary in order to redress the injustices committed against non-
whites, and economically necessary in order to redistribute South Africa’s wealth 
and alleviate widespread poverty (Zimmerman, 2000).   
Unfortunately, over a decade after the end of apartheid it is a widely-held 
and well-substantiated view that neither the political nor the economic objectives 
of land reform are being met (Zimmerman, 2000; Mather, 2002; Moseley, 2007). 
In its optimistic nascent years, the ANC promised to redistribute 30% of the entire 
nation’s land to “historically disadvantaged individuals” (non-whites) by 1999 as 
part of the broader national Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). 
When it became clear in 1999 that the land reform initiatives had fallen pitifully 
short of this goal, the target for 30% redistribution was pushed back to 2014 
(Cousins, 2006). In 2001, the figure for redistribution of white farms to non-
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whites stood at less than one percent of the country’s total land; as of 2006, all the 
land reform programs together (including restitution) had only redistributed four 
percent of the land (Mather, 2003; Cousins, 2006).  
Of the tiny fraction of farms that have been redistributed, an even smaller 
proportion succeeds in providing viable livelihoods for their beneficiaries. The 
post-apartheid government’s focus on economic growth for poverty alleviation 
has translated into neoliberal reform strategies and a market-led redistribution 
program that is increasingly focused on large-scale commercial agriculture—a 
system with which most beneficiaries have little, if any, experience (Zimmerman, 
2000). Additionally, the limited availability of grant funding often forces 
beneficiaries to pool their grants with dozens of other households to purchase a 
single farm (Moseley, 2007). Considering these complicated group management 
schemes, the lack of supportive infrastructure and participant experience, and the 
predictably unmanageable debts of high-input, chemically- and mechanically-
intensive modern farms, it is a wonder any redistribution projects have succeeded 
at all.  
In light of the current problems associated with the large-scale commercial 
redistribution model, the main objective of this research is exploratory in nature—
to investigate the viability of a small-hold farming model in hopes of finding an 
alternative mould for South Africa’s land redistribution program. As small-hold 
redistribution projects are rare, this research has, at least partially out of necessity, 
taken the form of a case study of one such project, a farm called Bokdrif*, in the 
Western Cape Province. This exploratory case study has sought to answer three 
                                                 
*
 Names have been changed to protect the identity of the farmers and some interviewees.  
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main research questions using a political ecology lens. First of all, can small-hold 
farms offer a more appropriately contextualized, economically sustainable 
business model than large-scale commercial farming? Next, do small-hold farms 
present a more environmentally sustainable business model than the current 
program? Finally, how does the level of beneficiary satisfaction with the small-
hold project compare with those of the conventional models?  
In the process of researching these questions, it became clear that my 
project was fulfilling a second, descriptive objective that I had not thought to 
include in my original research plan: it provides a powerful, concrete narrative of 
the very real difficulties encountered by ‘historically disadvantaged 
individuals’—a term that has attained connotations that are all too abstract—in 
their efforts to take back land that was wrested away from their ancestors. Writing 
this project from the point of view of an ‘objective’ academic observer became 
impossible, as did my attempt to rid my analysis of the emotional investments of 
all those parties involved in attempting to make Bokdrif a successful farm. 
Heasely (2005), reflecting on her experience as an African geographer, states “not 
only does detachment produce its own biases, in the worst cases it reproduces 
incorrect interpretations of relationships between people and their environment. 
These interpretations can have extraordinarily negative consequences for African 
people” (para. 6). Instead of restricting myself by adhering to the role of detached 
researcher, then, I have endeavored to give as full and honest an account of this 
project as I possibly can by including myself as a narrator and re-ifying my 
presence as the researcher. This is done in the hopes that it will add the insight of 
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a different perspective into the body of academic literature on land reform—a 
perspective on the ‘sweat, blood and tears’ that have been invested by so many 
people into land reform projects in South Africa. 
After an overview of the methods used to achieve the above two 
objectives, this paper proceeds with a literature review which examines academic 
conversations on land redistribution and small-hold farming models around the 
world, along with South Africa-specific land redistribution issues. This literature 
review is accompanied by a summary of the historical contexts needed for 
understanding land redistribution in the post-apartheid era. Next is a descriptive 
account of the Bokdrif farmers’ experience in the redistribution program, then a 
results section that analyzes the economic and environmental sustainability of the 
project, along with the participants’ satisfaction with it, in comparison with 
conventional projects. Finally, I conclude with recommendations for policy 
makers and suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter II 
Methodology 
 
 My interest in conducting this study on South African land reform 
stemmed from an independent research project I conducted as part of my study 
abroad program at the University of Cape Town from January to June, 2007. The 
program was titled “Globalization and the Natural Environment,” and included a 
seminar taught by my academic advisor at Macalester, William Moseley, who has 
researched and published articles on South African land reform (see Moseley, 
2006a; 2006b; 2007). I benefited greatly from his experience and contacts in this 
field, as he introduced me both to Bokdrif as a project and the people who would 
become my key informants for this paper.   
 To frame my primary research and field work, I examined three loosely 
defined bodies of literature. These included literature on land reform around the 
world, specifically in reference to market-led agrarian reform (MLAR), scholarly 
work that examines small-hold farming models in general (especially those which 
drew comparisons with large-scale commercial farming models), and finally, 
work that highlights South Africa-specific land reform issues. I chose these three 
topics because the combination of them allows an examination of two major 
themes of my research—land reform and small-hold agriculture—across multiple 
scales, which I believe crucial to a full understanding of my particular case study. 
It will hopefully prove to make my research conversant with as broad a body of 
academic literature as possible for the scope of my project.  
 
 
 10 
 
Bokdrif and the Case Study Model 
As previously mentioned, small-hold redistribution projects are somewhat 
uncommon in South Africa’s Western Cape Province (and in all of South Africa) 
primarily because of the government’s focus on large-scale models. To my 
knowledge, only one such project existed within the geographical extent of my 
possible research area as of the commencement of my investigation, making a 
‘deviant case study’ model the most effective and practical option for this 
research (Patton, 1990). A deviant case study illuminates the causal processes that 
have resulted in an atypical ‘case’ of a larger sample; in this instance, Bokdrif is 
an atypical example of the larger sampling of land reform projects in the Western 
Cape.  
The case study as a research model, deviant or otherwise, has often been 
belittled in academia and “stereotyped as a weak sibling among social science 
research methods,” labeled as overly subjective, imprecise, and lacking in rigor 
(Yin, 2003, pg. xiii). Despite this reputation, case studies can provide useful and 
even ideal research models when confronting a “technically distinctive situation 
in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points” (Yin, 
2003, pg. 13). The focus here, as opposed to other social science investigation 
methods, is on examining an entire process (land redistribution) as experienced by 
one entity (the beneficiaries), rather than a snapshot of one step of a process for a 
large number of actors. As my research aims to contribute to the formation of a 
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more effective land redistribution process for historically disadvantaged 
individuals, the deviant case study model is clearly appropriate.  
Schramm (1971) highlights further that case studies characteristically 
“illuminate a decision or set of decisions; why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result” (pg. 12, emphasis added). The answers to 
how these decisions have been implemented can be found in the in-depth 
examination of Bokdrif itself—the focus of my field work concerning its structure 
and operations, and the experience of the beneficiaries and the Project 
Management Team (PMT). The results of these decisions—their successes and 
failures—are what will be used to measure the viability of small-hold models 
against the conventional models. Examining the case of Bokdrif through a 
political ecology lens, the answers to why certain decisions were made can often 
be ultimately connected to broader government policy imperatives that work their 
way down to influence ‘ground level’ actions of those involved in Bokdrif’s 
formation. This framework for case study investigations has been helpful in 
structuring my project.  
 
Field Work 
The investigation of how beneficiaries’ decisions have been implemented 
necessitated field work both on and off the farm. As part of my on-farm research, 
my field work methods consisted primarily of semi-structured interviews, 
informal conversations on the ‘oral histories’ of the project, and overt participant 
observations. After learning of this unique small-hold hold project in the Western 
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Cape, I contacted two of the farmers at Bokdrif, Georg* and his wife Helen*, and 
an agricultural extension agent in the municipality, Paul*, who had worked very 
closely with the project. I chose to make Georg and Helen my principal 
informants for two main reasons, the first being that Georg served as the president 
of the Bokdrif Trust, making him the primary point of contact between the 
government and the farmers. This position had also made him the most 
accustomed to working with ‘outsiders’ like myself. The second reason was 
simply that of the farmers, Georg and Helen spoke the best English, and 
communication was much slower and less clear when I approached the other 
farmers.  
This reliance on Georg for most of my primary research represents a bias 
in my data. Georg is in a position of power, and I was not able to uncover any of 
the other farmers’ opinions on his leadership, or their feedback on the reliability 
of the information he was giving me. I was also unable to contact the beneficiaries 
who were not residing at Bokdrif, which again, represents a broader bias in my 
impressions of Bokdrif as a project. With the time and resource constraints faced, 
however, I would make the decision to rely on Georg as a primary informant 
again. As the president of the trust, he was, out of necessity, the best-acquainted 
with the logistics of their operation specifically, and of land redistribution 
generally. This makes his observations most conversant with the broader 
objectives of my paper—to contribute to an improved land reform policy. Further 
                                                 
*
 Names of the project, beneficiaries, and some interviewees (where indicated*) have been 
changed.  
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investigations of this nature, however, would benefit from the inclusion of the 
other farmers’ perspectives.  
After outlining my research objectives to Georg, Helen, and Paul, I asked 
permission to make pre-arranged observational visits to the farm, conduct 
interviews, and make Bokdrif the focus of my case study. As outlined in my 
proposal to Macalester College’s Social Science Institutional Review Board 
(SSIRB), I made very clear that participation was voluntary, and have made 
efforts to protect the anonymity of those who did not wish to have their names 
associated with this research. After receiving their consent under these conditions, 
I made periodic visits (a total of eight) to Bokdrif and the nearby agricultural 
extension office during the period of January to June 2007, and again during the 
month of January 2008.  
The on-farm interviewing processes varied depending on the topic of 
conversation. When I was interested in finding information to address my first 
two research questions, which investigate the economic and environmental 
sustainability of the farm (discussed further below), I conducted semi-structured 
interviews. These allowed me to glean factual, descriptive information about 
cultivation schemes, farm management, soil, or irrigation, for example, while 
permitting enough flexibility for the farmers to provide any additional related 
information on these topics. During other visits, when I was addressing my third 
research question investigating the level of participant satisfaction or exploring 
the project’s history, I conducted unstructured or informal interviews to allow the 
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farmers to lead the conversation through their experiences with, and opinions on, 
the project.  
In addition to on-farm interviews, much of my time spent at Bokdrif 
would be classified as what Kearns (2005) calls ‘uncontrolled participant 
observation’. The ‘uncontrolled’ aspect of my observations refers to the openness 
to all types of information. I was not searching for one type of data in particular, 
but instead observing all that I could and later deciding which parts of my 
observations were relevant to my objectives and research questions. My work was 
‘participant observation’ because as I observed, I was almost always taking part in 
the daily activities of the farm along with the farmers. These included afternoons 
picking beans in the field, helping prepare and participating in family meals, and 
taking breaks in the shade during the hottest parts of the days over home-made 
ginger beer. These observations and the informal conversations they inspired 
provided the “complementary and contextualizing evidence” that contributed 
most to my understanding of Bokdrif and the beneficiaries’ lives and struggles 
there (Yin 1983, pg. 13).  
It is important to note that the presence of an ‘outsider’ often changes the 
behavior of the ‘insiders’ being observed, yet as Kearns highlights, the continued 
“conscious participation in the social processes being observed increases the 
potential for more ‘natural’ interactions and responses to occur” (Kearns, 2005, 
pg. 196). It was my hope that the farmer’s confidence in and acceptance of me 
would increase with each additional visit, which was why I visited the farm on 
multiple occasions. Though there is no tangible way for me to measure whether 
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this was an effective strategy, the later interviews proved much more useful than 
did the initial ones, giving credence to Kearns’ assertion.   
In order to put this primary information about Bokdrif and the 
beneficiaries in broader political and economic contexts, I conducted field work 
outside of Bokdrif as well. This research consisted almost completely of semi-
structured interviews with members of Bokdrif’s project management team 
(PMT), a planning and guiding committee that is required for all land reform 
projects. As many of the members of the PMT were entities rather than 
individuals (for example, the Provincial Department of Agriculture), it was often 
difficult to determine which representatives from which organizations should be 
interviewed. Generally, I aspired to speak with anyone who had been involved 
with Bokdrif and had made contributions to or had information about the project. 
Selection for my off-farm interviews was generally opportunistic, as I followed 
the leads given to me by my interviewees who had experience and contacts in the 
field.  
Another aspect of this off-farm portion of my field work was examining as 
many relevant documents from the interviewees as possible. Members of the PMT 
were especially helpful in providing various documents that were very useful in 
analyzing the economic and environmental aspects of Bokdrif. These included 
budgets, business management plans, official government documents, grant 
proposals, soil test results, water consumption data, and maps. One major setback 
in analyzing these documents was that the vast majority of them were in 
Afrikaans. As my time for the project was limited, I was often forced to choose 
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which parts of documents would be most useful to my study and have only small 
portions of them translated by interviewees or friends. Though this process 
restricted the usefulness of these documents, they were still invaluable to my 
analysis.  
 
Data Analysis 
After completing fieldwork, I organized the results of the decisions made 
by those involved with Bokdrif into three categories that correspond to my three 
research questions: economic sustainability, environmental sustainability, and 
participant satisfaction. These divisions have been made primarily for analytical 
purposes, but the categories are not isolated from each other. On the contrary, 
successes in any one of the categories directly affect the other aspects of the 
project. Even while I have separated them for the sake of organization, it will 
remain important to reiterate the interconnectedness of these aspects and their 
contribution to the overall success of Bokdrif.   
Assessment of the farm’s economic sustainability is divided into four 
categories. The first is the financial viability of the cultivation scheme, which 
includes examination of market availability, proximity, and stability. Next, I look 
at incomes, which are coming from many sources for the farmers at Bokdrif, 
while expenditures are the focus of the following category. Finally, I examine the 
livelihood security of the farmers, which constitutes a reflection on the 
combination of all preceding categories. Within each category, I make 
comparisons between these aspects of Bokdrif and those of conventional South 
 17 
African farms. Like the broader category under which these are organized, these 
sub-categories are not exclusionary, but do help put the field work in a more 
understandable format.  
Environmental sustainability is the next platform of my analysis of 
Bokdrif, and is also divided into four categories: soil health, water consumption, 
energy consumption, and chemical use practices. This is not an exhaustive list of 
potential factors that contribute to agriculture’s environmental degradation, but 
highlights what I consider to be the major issues facing farmers in the Western 
Cape, which will be highlighted further in following sections. Again, within each 
category, I compare Bokdrif’s practices with those of more conventional farms.  
Finally, participant satisfaction is the focus of the third category. This 
category is clearly less ‘objective’ than the others, yet it seems clear that the 
sentiments harboured by farmers towards both their farm and their fellow farmers 
play a crucial role in the overall success of redistribution project. Many of the 
project failures to date are a result of the frustrations of and conflicts between 
farmers, managers, and shareholders, who no doubt find it difficult to fully 
dedicate themselves to a project in which they find little satisfaction. Though this 
is a central aspect of the project, it has been the most difficult category to 
represent accurately. My method for analyzing is simply to include as much of the 
opinions of the farmers as I possibly can, while offering a few of my own 
interpretations of their expressions.  
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A political ecology approach 
 My research is analyzed on the theoretical basis of political ecology, 
which provides many useful lenses for examining the complex, interacting 
processes that form the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to successful land 
reform in South Africa. Political ecology has been described as the political 
economy of human-environment interactions, a “confluence between ecologically 
rooted social science and the principles of political economy” (Peet and Watts 
1996). It sets itself apart from western paradigms of environmental discourses by 
tending to focus geographically on the global south (although this trend is 
changing—see, for example, McCarthy and Hague, 2004; St. Martin, 2001; 
Walker, 2003) and conceptually on livelihoods, especially those of marginal 
populations. A political ecology framework utilizes explanatory ‘chains of 
causation’ in attempt to find root causes for livelihood issues and environmental 
problems, examining how policies and economic conditions at multiple scales 
work their way down to the ground to influence the land and the people who work 
the most closely with it (see Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and Watts, 1996; 
Robbins, 2004).  
Political ecology’s focus on marginalization is appropriate for examining 
the processes at work at Bokdrif and in South African agriculture in general—
socially marginalized “historically disadvantaged individuals” have been set apart 
by the color of their skin and forced onto environmentally marginal lands, 
compromising the viability of their livelihoods and furthering their economic 
marginalization. Even within these seemingly homogeneous populations, 
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additional marginalization occurs on the basis of gender, age, or social status. 
Marginalized farmers seek help from the post-apartheid state, whose 
responsibility to protect its most vulnerable populations and resources is perverted 
by aspirations of developing a globally competitive market economy. This “dual 
role of the state” is a phenomena highlighted by Bryant and Bailey (1997, pg. 62). 
These authors offer additional insight on the intra-state conflict seen in many 
“functionally defined states”—those whose bureaucracies and departments are 
organized on the basis of resource management and development, making 
national environmental conservation goals difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. 
Bryant and Bailey’s (1997) theory on the role of the state will be helpful in 
analyzing the South African government’s contradictory policies for land reform, 
as seen from the point of view of the actors involved in my case study.   
Robbins’ (2004) degradation and marginalization thesis is also applicable 
to the land reform program, and provides a framework for examining cases where 
“otherwise environmentally innocuous local production systems undergo 
transition to overexploitation of natural resources on which they depend as a 
response to state development intervention and increasing integration in regional 
and global markets” (pg. 131). While local production systems in South Africa 
cannot, in many cases, be classified as environmentally innocuous, any ambition 
to operate “innocuously” is thwarted by the state’s unwavering emphasis on large-
scale commercial agriculture. This thesis will be an additional analytical tool for 
understanding broader trends that affect the decisions made by all involved with 
Bokdrif.  
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My positionality  
 As with all social science research involving human subjects, especially 
those of marginal groups, it has been important to be conscious of my role as the 
researcher. My ‘position’ in relation to those I was interviewing was not easily 
ignored—I was a young, white, educated, English-speaking, American female 
‘academic’ interacting with a generally impoverished, rural, Afrikaans-speaking, 
non-white, less educated community. My status as an outsider was thus 
immediately visible, even if the farmers’ comfort with my presence increased 
over time.  
It is also worth noting that being a white American carried different 
connotations than would being a white South African. In my observation, non-
whites in South Africa in general are less trusting of white South Africans (than 
other white populations) because they associate white South Africans more 
closely with their negative experiences during apartheid. Additionally, as 
apartheid ended so recently, many white South Africans seem to have the same 
internalized notions of race and difference that were originally fostered by the 
apartheid government. As a white American, I was distanced from that 
relationship in a sense, and I think, seen as more of a confidant by the farmers.  
Despite the evident differences, there was still room for common ground. 
One aspect that I believe to have been a crucial influence on the information the 
farmers shared with me—and how it was framed—is my own background in 
farming. I was born and raised on my family’s small farm in Wisconsin, and the 
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ease of conversation with the farmers increased markedly after I shared personal 
stories and pictures of home with them. The farmers were often as curious about 
my farm as I was about theirs, and it provided a very useful conversation starter 
and point of comparison. They had interacted with a fair number of academics 
and seemed to have their own idea of the type of information they thought 
academics were looking for. It seemed clear to me that they presented information 
about their farm to me differently once my status changed from ‘academic’ to 
‘academic/fellow farmer’, if only in a less guarded, more candid manner. The 
effect of my status as both insider and outsider will be addressed further in later 
sections.  
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Chapter III  
History of Land Issues in South Africa 
 
To provide some background and context for discussion on the academic 
literature, it will be helpful to briefly overview some events and policies in South 
African history that are relevant to current land reform issues. South Africa has an 
extraordinarily complex history, and it would be impossible to do it justice in this 
short space, but I have tried here to choose the key points.  
The Natives Land Act of 1913 illegalized ownership of land by non-
whites in all but a few small areas of South Africa, dispossessing ‘natives’ to 
crowded, environmentally marginal ‘Homelands’, or ‘Bantustans’. Under this 
legislation, 87% of the land area in South Africa was reserved for whites only, 
who comprised only around 15% of the population at the time. The other 13% of 
the nation’s land represented the fragments that were undesirable to the white 
population for their poor soils, geographic isolation, and general dearth of natural 
resources and infrastructure (Mather, 2003). The ten Homelands were divided on 
the basis of ethnicity, and separate areas were demarcated for people of Xhosa, 
Zulu, Ndebele, Basotho, Sesotho, Swazi, Tswana, Bapedi, Venda, and Tsonga 
origins. Though these areas were not geographically contiguous, non-whites were 
not allowed free passage through the white areas that separated them, furthering 
their isolation [see Figure 1]. Over time, the exhausted soils of the Bantustans 
became increasingly unable to support any form of agricultural livelihoods 
(Thompson, 2001).  
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Figure 1  
The Former South African Homelands (Bantustans) 
 
 
Source: Martins, Antonio. 2006/ Flags of  the World website. Accessed 14 April 2008 at 
http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/za(old.html 1 
 
Over the span of the apartheid regime, much of the population in the 
Homelands was all but forced to undergo a transformation from rural peasants to 
urban proletarians to suit the labour needs of the National Party’s economic 
growth strategies for South Africa (Ross, 1999). Many families derived the largest 
share of their income from remittances earned by male heads-of-households who 
                                                 
1
 Maps and boundary data are copyrighted by <A HREF="www.fotw.net/flags/g_ix.html">FOTW 
- Flags Of The World web site</a>. For more copyright information, please see 
http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/g-copy.html  
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moved away to seek employment in urban areas or mining complexes,  as South 
Africa’s wealth of mineral resources in particular created a demand for cheap, 
spatially-concentrated labour. The migrant labourers were often concentrated in 
single-sex dormitories provided by mining companies, and were only allowed to 
return home to their families for a very small portion of the year. Eventually, 
significant sex-worker populations grew around these areas. Many scholars cite 
apartheid’s engrained pattern of migrant labour as one of the main reasons South 
Africa provided such ideal conditions for the spread of HIV/AIDS, and resultantly 
has one of the world’s highest incidences of HIV/AIDS (Thompson, 2001).  
In the Homelands was a huge class of poor rural children, elderly, and 
women, who were left to support their families and cultivate alone what little land 
they had. For those who persevered, there was little hope for anything more than a 
bare subsistence-level existence (Ross, 1999). Millions of non-whites were thus 
forcibly displaced, both physically and ideologically, from their homes, their 
communities, and, despite the fact that the Homelands were rural areas, from their 
livelihoods as farmers.  
Outside of the Bantustans, virtually the only non-whites involved in 
agriculture constituted a destitute farm worker population—employed by white 
commercial farming operations—whose rights were scarcely better than those of 
slave labourers (Hall, Kleinbooi and Mvambo, 2001; Scully, 1992). The farm 
worker population has been studied extensively in the Western Cape in particular 
because it is one of the provinces with the best-established commercial farming 
sectors, which require large amounts of cheap labor. In the Western Cape, the 
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majority of farm workers have historically been Afrikaans-speaking coloreds2, 
most commonly employed by vineyards or orchards. There were few laws 
protecting the rights of these farm workers, and they were thus subject to 
evictions from their on-farm dwellings, poor education systems, harsh labor 
conditions, low wages, and payment in the form of alcohol. This practice of wine-
as-wages, referred to as the ‘tot’ or ‘dop’ system, created a legacy of alcoholism 
in the colored farm worker population which still exists today (Scully, 1992). As a 
result, the colored population in the Western Cape has a chronically high rate of 
children born with fetal alcohol syndrome and other alcohol-related birth 
defects—the highest in South Africa. Many children who grow up with the related 
learning disabilities are written off by under-resourced rural education systems 
and do not attain the same levels of education as their white counterparts, further 
embedding the social and economic marginalization of the colored farm-worker 
population (GARC, 2006).  
The continuous displacement of non-whites during the apartheid years had 
vacated prime agricultural land across the country for white commercial farmers. 
During this period, many agricultural products could only (legally) be marketed 
domestically because of international embargoes against the apartheid regime. As 
the National Party held the simultaneous goals of instituting a cheap food policy 
and supporting white farmers, the regime provided generous subsidies to shield 
many fledging white commercial farms from the competition of cheap imports 
                                                 
2
 In South Africa, ‘colored’ is a term used to describe those with ‘mixed race’ origins, and, unlike 
the American use of the term, is not considered derogatory. The colored population was 
considered by the apartheid government to be a step above the black African population, a 
classification now seen as a technique to divide non-whites to prevent a unified anti-apartheid 
movement (Thompson, 2001).  
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(Mather and Greenberg, 2003). In addition, white farms benefited immensely 
from the cheap labour provided by the oppressed, disempowered farm workers, as 
discussed above (Scully, 1992).  
This subsidized white commercial agriculture was concentrated in the 
Western Cape, a province whose varied terrain and climatic systems allowed the 
establishment of a diverse production regime. Deciduous fruit (including apples, 
pears, peaches, citrus, cherries and grapes), vegetables, wine grapes and wheat 
were all successfully cultivated there. Dairying and livestock production (beef, 
sheep, poultry, swine and ostrich) also contributed significantly to agricultural 
output (Statistics South Africa, 2004). As the apartheid era drew to a close, a 
lucrative, heavily-subsidized, white-dominated agricultural sector was well 
established. 
 
The post-apartheid era  
By the early 1990s, whites comprised only 13% of the population, yet still 
held ownership of the same 87% of land allotted for them with the 1913 Land Act 
(DLA 1997). As previously mentioned, land redistribution was therefore both 
politically necessary and crucial to promoting greater economic equality across 
racial lines, especially considering that the vast majority of South Africa’s poor 
live in rural areas (Davis, Horn, and Govender-Van Wyk, 2004). The 
government’s goals to alleviate poverty and improve social services were 
embodied in the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which was 
introduced shortly after the first democratic elections in 1994. Though it differed 
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from other national development initiatives like structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) in its official focus on social service delivery, it identified macroeconomic 
growth as the catalyst for social service improvements, and thus contained many 
neo-liberal economic policies that closely resembled those of SAPs. These 
commonalities included trade liberalization, reduction in government spending 
and debt, and lowered taxes. With its two faces, the RDP attempted to represent 
the development ideologies of both the new, more socialist ANC government, and 
influential international development institutions like the World Bank (Carmody, 
2002).   
The land reform aspect of the RDP was the government’s official Land 
Reform Programme put out by the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) in 1995, 
followed by the White Paper on Land Reform in 1997. In these documents, the 
DLA outlined three facets to the national land reform initiative. The first was a 
land tenure reform program targeted at addressing issues of land use and 
ownership rights, both in the former Bantustans and for labourers on white 
commercial farms. Next, its land restitution aspect restored land or cash payment 
to any displaced after the 1913 Lands Act, providing they had some proof of 
ownership of a specific plot prior to displacement. Finally, the land redistribution 
program provided grants for the purchase of land and agricultural implements to 
‘historically disadvantaged’ households who applied (DLA 1997). The stated goal 
of this national policy was to “provide the disadvantaged and the poor with access 
to land for residential and productive purposes in order to improve their income 
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and quality of life,” which it would achieve in transferring “30% of agricultural 
land to black South Africans within 5 years [of 1994]” (DLA, 1997, pgs. 9, 38).  
The functional arm of the redistribution facet was the Settlement Land 
Acquisition Grant (SLAG) program, which provided a maximum of R16,000 
(roughly US $2,286) per ‘historically disadvantaged’ household that applied, with 
the exact award amount being determined by the household’s demonstrated need. 
As even this maximum potential grant amount fell far short of the funds needed to 
purchase adequate land for cultivation, much less an entire farm and the required 
infrastructure and implements, beneficiaries were often forced to pool their grants 
with as many as 100 other grant recipients to buy a farm. SLAG was largely 
ineffective, managing to transfer only 480,000 of the 25.5 million hectares needed 
to reach the goal of 30% redistribution by 1999 (Davis, Horn, and Govender-Van 
Wyk, 2004).  
Despite the fact that this ambitious goal was never reached, it inspired 
fears in the country’s bastions of white commercial farming that South Africa 
would follow in Zimbabwe’s disastrous footsteps—employing violent force to 
ensure redistributive ‘success’. Because of these fears, many asserted that the use 
of any government mandated removals, however diplomatic and dissimilar from 
those of Zimbabwe’s Zanu PF government, would lead to the collapse of the 
entire agricultural production system. Additionally, many white farmers had little 
faith in the ability of black farmers to effectively run a commercial farming 
operation (a sentiment which unfortunately persists today) (Goebel, 2005).  
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In 1996, the ANC government introduced the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the official plan for South Africa’s economic 
restructuring. This neo-liberal, ‘Washington consensus’ model strategy called for 
market liberalization and deregulation to revitalize stale, inefficient domestic 
production. In the agricultural sector, this translated into a phase-out of almost all 
agricultural subsidies, underscoring that the new South Africa would have less 
sympathy for the “economic deadweight” the white commercial farming industry 
had become (Carmody, 2002; Mather and Greenberg, 2003).  While some sectors 
of production benefited from the newly acquired access to international markets, 
such as the wine industry, others quickly felt the sting of international competition 
impinging on formerly protected domestic markets (the wheat industry was 
particularly susceptible to international competition) (Moseley, 2007).  
In 1999, the second democratic elections saw Thabo Mbeki as the new 
president of South Africa. There was a re-organization of power, and Mbeki 
replaced many Mandela-appointed ministers, including the Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, with more ‘business-friendly’ candidates. Shortly 
after this shift, the SLAG program was succeeded by the Land Reform for 
Agricultural Development program (LRAD), which increased the potential grant 
size with a sliding scale model. Applicants could receive anywhere between 
R20,000 and R100,000 (between US $2,857 and $14,286), depending on the 
applicant’s own contribution of either cash or ‘sweat equity’. LRAD also allowed 
any adult individual to apply for a grant, which made possible multiple grants per 
household. This more neoliberal program was aimed specifically at creating a 
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class of black commercial farmers modeled after the white commercial farming 
sector (Mather, 2002; Moseley, 2007). Unfortunately, neither SLAG nor LRAD 
has helped South Africa come close to achieving 30% redistribution by 1999, as 
only 4% of the nation’s land had been distributed by 2006 (Cousins, 2006).  
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Chapter IV  
Literature Review 
 
 Now that I have laid the base of descriptive information about South 
African land reform, I will move onto broader analytical discussions concerning 
land reform in this literature review. The research conducted for this project is 
related to a number of different threads of debate surrounding agrarian reform 
around the world. One of the most prominent of these debates has centered on 
whether reforms should be market-led or state-led. Proponents of market-led 
agrarian reform (MLAR) cite that the state does not have the capacity to 
effectively or efficiently redistribute land. Because state appropriation of land 
often provides sellers with a price that is less than market value, they argue, any 
state intervention leads current land owners to “subvert the policy, evade coverage 
by subdividing their farms or retain the best parts of the land” (Borras, 2003, pg. 
368).  
In addition, state-led reform is often supply-led, and pro-market reformists 
thus tout it as inherently inefficient. This, they say, is because most often the state 
is only able to redistribute environmentally marginal land, because “productive 
farms are expropriated and subdivided into smaller, less productive farm units,” 
and because “peasant households ‘unfit’ to become beneficiaries... are given lands 
to farm” (Borras, 2003, pg. 368). The threat of state expropriation creates an 
uncertainty that discourages much-needed investment from a variety of sources 
while encouraging corruption in government officials and the land titling system 
in general (Banerjee, 1999). Furthermore, state-led programs create a need for a 
“behemoth”-sized bureaucracy that places huge strain on national budgets, even 
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more than the strain of the state having to fund the purchase of the redistributed 
land itself (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997).  
In contrast to state-led redistribution systems, MLAR proponents argue, 
MLAR provides a far more effective strategy for redistributing land, and in 
addition, encourages land-use systems that are far more economically efficient. In 
the ideal MLAR program, argue Buainain et al. (1996), “only individuals with 
human capital, previous savings, and adequate knowledge of how to make use of 
the opportunities would make the decision to participate in the Programme ... 
[MLAR will select] local people, who have closer relations with landowners, 
better access to networks of social relations and information on local markets of 
land” (pp. 29-30).  
Proponents of state-led reform (such as Zimmerman, 2000; Mather, 2002; 
Hall, 2004; Moseley, 2007) would argue that it is at exactly these points that 
MLAR fails. Because the goal of many national land redistribution programs is to 
redistribute wealth, those who are meant to benefit from redistribution would not 
have access to savings or start-up capital. As the potential beneficiaries of land 
redistribution are most often part of a historically marginalized population, it is 
also very unlikely that they would have access to the ‘human capital’ and the 
‘networks of social relations and information on local markets of land’ of which 
Buainain et al. (1996) speak.  
Addressing these issues in the South African context, Zimmerman (2000) 
highlights the many problems inherent in SLAG. He argues that the program’s 
target population—the poor—have less a chance than anyone at succeeding in a 
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land redistribution project. He reasons that the poor are much less likely to be able 
to afford the high up-front costs of land redistribution and initial contributions 
necessary to receive a reasonably-sized grant. They also have less mobility to 
move the long distances to the new redistribution sites where public infrastructure 
is often poorer than that in the urban fringes, if it exists at all. They often have 
less time to put into the project if they do move because they need to dedicate 
more of their time to acquiring additional income. Almost invariably, grant 
applicants lack adequate training in agricultural techniques or business 
management, are more vulnerable to risks involved in agriculture, and have very 
limited access to credit, educational programs and training, or agricultural 
extension services. Even in the rare cases that a poor, non-white household has 
access to the information needed to apply for grants, is able to write a coherent 
grant and business plan, and move to the new redistribution site, it is highly 
unlikely that the household has any familiarity with methods for successfully 
managing a farm. 
 Far from addressing these problems, Mather (2002) argues that the newer 
LRAD program was even more inappropriately focused on commercial 
agriculture and creating a class of black commercial farmers, representing a 
complete misunderstanding of the problems it was attempting to address in 
replacing SLAG. Again, this had the effect of excluding the very population the 
redistribution programs have targeted: poor non-white South Africans.  
In a similar vein, Ruth Hall (2004) speaks to the political ecology theme of 
dualism in her analysis of the shortcomings of South Africa’s national land 
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redistribution policies. She locates the ineffectiveness of LRAD in its failure to 
target the ‘agrarian dualism’ that is the source of the plight of the rural poor in 
South Africa. The dualism exists between the modern, capital-intensive white 
farming economy and the traditional, labor-intensive black farming economy in 
the homelands. During the apartheid years, ‘racial capitalism’ created this 
dualism, exploiting the rural black economy to effectively subsidize the white 
economy with cheap labor. Since the end of apartheid, Hall argues, national land 
reform policies have failed to effect any real change in the country side because 
“the advent of non-racial democracy has seen a new configuration of class 
interests and the emergence of a powerful alliance that is committed to 
deracialising ownership but retaining the structure of the commercial farming 
sector rather than restructuring the agrarian regime” (pg. 213). Instead of 
restructuring the dualistic system, then, policies have focused only on attempting 
to bring more non-whites over to the ‘modern’ side of the existing system. She 
illustrates further the contradiction between ‘big policy and the shrinking state’, 
pointing out that while the land redistribution targets are incredibly ambitious, the 
state itself is increasingly unable to meet its own policy goals as development 
spending is restricted by neoliberal, SAP-like economic policies. Here, it is 
broader macroeconomic trends that “favor limited state involvement in the 
economy” that present a major obstacle to social restructuring.  
Moseley (2007) further highlights that LRAD’s focus on large-scale 
commercial agriculture has been detrimental to the success of the projects, 
especially for the vulnerable farm worker population in the Western Cape. He 
 35 
discusses eight specific barriers to successful land redistribution in that province 
in particular. Neoliberal economic reforms, he argues, make the unprotected 
agricultural sector vulnerable, and the associated willing seller / willing buyer 
model leads to grant recipients receiving economically marginal farms. The small 
grant size (even with the sliding scale model of LRAD) necessitates an 
unmanageable number of farm operators, many of whom have unrealistic 
expectations for financial gains; these hopes have often been inspired by the white 
farms made successful by apartheid era protectionism. He argues further that 
grant recipients’ agricultural skills are often mismatched for the farms they buy or 
are too specialized in one area (eg., vine pruning) to be useful in whole-farm 
management. Aside from inappropriate farming skills, many grant recipients have 
no business management skills at all. Even with all this potential for failure, 
protection and legal oversight is woefully insufficient in cases where problems do 
arise. Finally, an insurmountable number of bureaucratic layers in the 
redistribution project impede the grant recipients’ access to funds. He suggests 
that allowing LRAD beneficiaries to practice small-hold or subsistence 
agricultural practices would improve the success rates of some of the projects and 
contribute to agrarian justice in the countryside.  
 The small-hold option that Moseley suggests is another controversial 
subject in South African land redistribution. The economic and environmental 
efficiency of small-hold model farms versus large-scale commercial farms is a 
contested debate among policy makers and scholars in the field (for example, 
Low, Akwenye, and Kamwi, 1999; Sender and Johnston, 2004; Lahiff and 
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Cousins, 2005; Skarstein, 2005). Moor and Nieuwoudt (1998) use examples of 
land tenure in Zimbabwe to inform South African land redistribution policy. They 
find, from their research, that secure tenure rights at the level of the individual 
family have a significant positive effect on both investment and agricultural 
productivity levels. They also state that often, small-scale farms owned by 
individual families are more environmentally innocuous than both large-scale 
commercial farms and farms that are communally owned by large groups. They 
compare situations in Zimbabwe to those in South Africa, arguing that secure 
tenure rights are crucial to land redistribution and that redistribution projects 
should not be communally owned by too many people—what they call the 
‘indigenous’ model—because they are unproductive and environmentally 
degrading. While this conception of what communally-owned ‘indigenous’ 
models entail seems misinformed, their research is valuable to South African land 
reform because it provides some explanatory power as to why so many land 
redistribution projects that are owned by too many people fail.  
The combination of this literature suggests that market-led reforms are 
failing to address the poverty alleviation goals of land redistribution. 
Redistribution projects that hundreds of people attempt to co-manage stand very 
little chance of succeeding, and large-scale commercial agriculture has not been 
an appropriate focus in many cases. Clearly, an alternative model for land 
redistribution is necessary—and this is where the analysis of Bokdrif’s history 
and current successes and failures is relevant.  
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Chapter V  
Project History 
 
In this section, I describe the personal history of two of the farmers 
involved in Bokdrif, Georg and Helen, and their experience with the land 
redistribution process. This is helpful in showing the ways in which these 
beneficiaries are typical of and different from the ‘average’ land redistribution 
grant recipients in the Western Cape Province (see Figure 2). The comparisons 
drawn here will be helpful in interpreting the results of their efforts, and analyzing 
their successes and failures in the broader national context of land redistribution.  
Figure 2  
Swartland Municipality  
 
Source: Swartland Municipality http://www.swartland.org.za/  
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Figure 3 
South Africa  
 
Source: Times Atlas, 1998 
Like many ‘Cape Coloureds’, Georg grew up as part of a family of farm 
workers on a vineyard in the Western Cape. His family worked and lived on the 
vineyard, and were given small plots of land to grow their own vegetables. From a 
young age, he was taught how to cultivate many different vegetables and grew to 
enjoy gardening work. In primary school he completed levels up to standard four 
(roughly equivalent to fourth grade in American education systems) while living 
at home on the vineyard, but there was little education infrastructure for children 
of farm workers to take advantage of in the rural areas. For many farm workers’ 
children, continuing education past this point necessitated moving off the farm 
and into a nearby town. This was a difficult and often prohibitively expensive 
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arrangement for many families, and as previously mentioned, has unfortunately 
meant that the farm worker population maintained a generally low level of 
educational achievement. Georg was unique in that he was able to secure lodging 
and employment working for a doctor in Malmesbury (see Figure 3). He stayed at 
the doctor’s home and worked at his office during the day while attending night 
classes to finish standard eight. 
From then on, he worked odd jobs in the Cape area and eventually married 
Helen, another native of the Malmesbury area. Together they had three children 
whom they raised in Malmesbury. While the children were young, Helen worked 
in Malmesbury as a seamstress, and Georg commuted to work at an auto repair 
center in Cape Town everyday by train, which was a 60km one-way journey. 
During this period, Georg struggled with the alcoholism that troubled so many 
other coloured families, bringing his marriage to the brink of divorce. When he 
came home one day and found his wife and children gone, he decided to become a 
farmer again, despite the significantly lower income levels, thinking it would have 
a rehabilitative effect on him. After reconciling with his family, they moved to the 
Atlantis area and joined the Atlantis Small Farmers Association (ASFA), which 
had been recommended to Georg by a friend from his childhood on the vineyard.  
ASFA is a non-profit organization dedicated to providing many types of 
relevant job training to aspiring small farmers in the region, the majority of who 
are coloured former farm workers like Georg and Helen. ASFA offers classes in a 
variety of topics, including financial bookkeeping, farm management, animal 
husbandry, and crop-specific cultivation techniques. In addition to training, the 
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organization provides families with accommodation and plots of land which they 
are allowed to lease on a yearly basis and are used to put their training into 
practice. After Georg and Helen spent a few years there, they and few of their 
ASFA neighbors became interested in establishing a more permanent foothold on 
the plots they farmed there. Many of the farmers approached ASFA management 
seeking extended leases and more secure tenure rights, but were repeatedly 
denied. ASFA’s structure was not set up to provide the kind of tenure 
arrangement Georg was interested in, so he and Helen began to investigate their 
options for owning their own land.  
 In 2001, they approached Paul*, an agricultural extension agent at the 
Swartland Municipal Department of Agriculture Office in Malmesbury and asked 
for help and advice. Paul pointed out that they were eligible for LRAD grants. 
However, he had had experience with over a dozen LRAD projects in the past, 
and recommended Georg and Helen proceed cautiously in light of the fact that 
every LRAD project in the district thus far had failed. He attributed this 
phenomenon to the conflicts inspired by the large number of applicants who 
attempted to co-manage the projects. In his experience, he witnessed differences 
in managerial style mount into tensions that affected personal relationships 
between the beneficiaries, often leading to irreconcilable conflicts. Once 
professional relationships had been complicated by personal issues, Paul 
recounted, it became even more difficult for members of the project management 
teams (PMTs) to help mediate and provide technical support. Based on his 
                                                 
*
 Names of the project, beneficiaries, and some interviewees (where indicated*) have been 
changed. 
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experience with these large-scale projects, he conjectured that LRAD farms 
would fare better if they were divided up into units that were small enough to be 
managed by individual families. Though Paul holds that it was his idea originally, 
Georg also claimed ownership of the single-family plot plan. Georg says his 
acquaintances who were members to other LRAD projects in the area had warned 
him about the difficulties in attempting to manage a communally-owned project.  
Regardless of where the idea originally came from, both Paul and Georg 
realized the importance of finding other dedicated people to be part of the project, 
so Georg decided to approach the other farmers who had been similarly trained at 
the ASFA. From their acquaintances there, Georg recruited seven other families 
who were willing to apply with them, for a total of 35 eligible grant applicants in 
all.  
 After finding other beneficiaries, the next step was to put together the 
project management team (PMT) necessary to all LRAD projects. Their PMT 
consisted of the Provincial Department of Land Affairs, the Provincial 
Department of Agriculture, the Swartland (Malmesbury) Municipality, the non-
profit organization Goedgedacht Agricultural Resource Centre (GARC, a branch 
of the larger Goedgedacht Trust), and another non-profit organization called the 
West Coast Ubuntu Farmer’s Association (WEKUFU, also a branch of 
Goedgedacht), along with all the grant applicants.  
The next step of the LRAD application process assigned to the farmers 
was to search the real-estate market in the area for a suitable piece of land for the 
farm. Every potential farm site had to be brought before all members of the PMT, 
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examined in terms of the soil conditions, water supplies, infrastructure available, 
terrain, and a host of other factors to measure the plot’s suitability for cultivation 
and habitation. The group met about every month to go over possible sites for the 
farm, and after a few months of searching, they found a site that looked 
promising. It was a 31 hectare section of a larger white-owned farm called 
Bokdrif. When divided, the parcel would leave slightly less than four hectares per 
family. This was a sufficient size for the small-scale scheme the group had in 
mind, and represented a plot size suitable for their training at ASFA. The site was 
tested in a myriad of ways—in terms of soil drainage, soil erosion potential, soil 
consistency and minerals, minerals in the ground water, depth to groundwater and 
many others. It was also important that the site have characteristics at least 
slightly similar to those at ASFA so that the farmers could render their training 
applicable on their own new farms. It is important to note that, as is the case with 
many other LRAD parcels, the land available for sale to the beneficiaries in 
Georg’s group was the least productive corner of a white-owned farm. The white 
farmer who owned the larger Bokdrif was selling it in part because of its reduced 
productivity in comparison with the rest of his land. Still, this land was the best 
available to the Bokdrif beneficiaries. 
Once all the tests were completed to determine that the site was sufficient, 
the PMT began examining ways to put infrastructure on the property. At the time, 
there was no electricity infrastructure, running water, housing, nor any 
agricultural buildings. Paul cites the first “big battle” of the redistribution process 
as the difficult negotiations with Eskom, the largest energy company in South 
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Africa, which functions similar to a para-statal. The farmers attempted to 
persuade the company to install the kind of transformer they felt was necessary 
for the success of their operation. In the end, Eskom refused their requests, 
building them only a 50 Rva system despite their call for a 100 Rva system.  
Georg believes this was ultimately because of a lack of funding.  
Another unexpected “big battle” they encountered was something as 
seemingly trivial as the entrance to the farm. Bokdrif is located adjacent to a 
national highway, the N7, necessitating permission from the Provincial 
Department of Road Affairs to build a driveway entrance. This proved a very 
difficult task, and the project participants tired of waiting for responses from the 
bureaucratic layers of the Department of Road Affairs, who denied all the 
propositions put forth by the PMT. Despite the PMT’s proposal of many creative 
solutions, such as stemming off of existing driveways or cutting across others’ 
properties, for example, the permission for driveway construction on the N7 never 
came. Because there was no other access to the plot, this battle with the 
Department of Road Affairs delayed the progress of infrastructure construction on 
the plot, and set the whole project back by a few months. Finally, Paul and the 
PMT decided to “bypass” the Department of Road Affairs and simply build an 
access road themselves. They laid down a gravel road directly adjacent to an 
existing driveway, predicting that the Department of Road Affairs would have 
neither the time nor the resources to pursue legal action against them. Luckily, 
their predictions were correct, and they were able to continue work on the farm. 
Speaking in more general terms, Paul has said that many other governmental 
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departments “turn a blind-eye” to situations such as these, recognizing that they 
are too under-staffed and under-funded to be bothered with enforcing rules about 
driveways, for example. He claims that had he not taken the initiative to help the 
participants build their driveway, they would still be waiting today for a practical 
way to access their farm from the highway.  
As another part of creating their management plans, the farmers 
brainstormed with the other organizations on the PMT to decide on their business 
goals. The Department of Land Affairs requires a five-year business plan of 
aspiring LRAD beneficiaries before approval of their grant applications, and it is 
at this juncture in the LRAD journey that the government has held the power to 
sway projects towards implementing a conventional farm business model. Unlike 
the structure of many LRAD business proposals before theirs, the participants 
decided to model theirs based on a gradual process of increased productive 
potential. According to their business trajectory, they would start out in the first 
few years as mainly subsistence level farmers and slowly increase their 
productive capacity to become individual, family-run small commercial 
operations. They would focus on vegetable farming, which suited much of the 
training they had received in Atlantis. As an additional measure to maintain food 
security, the farmers would also keep livestock on a family-by-family basis, 
including pigs, goats, cows, and chickens.  
After these careful preparations, the grant applications were submitted to 
the Department of Land Affairs and were initially rejected because of the family-
unit model that was being proposed. The Department criticized the low-input, low 
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productivity model and pushed instead for a farm structure that would afford 
higher productivity levels. According to Paul, it took a great deal of convincing 
and appealing to peers in government on his part for the project to gain approval 
and proceed as planned. As for funding for the project, each of the 35 grant 
applicants was eligible for around R20,000 (about US $2,857), bringing their total 
LRAD grant money up to a little over R700,000 (about US $100,000). After 
receiving the Department of Land Affair’s approval for their LRAD project, the 
participants were then also eligible for credit loans from the government-run Land 
Bank, which lends significant amounts of money to most fledgling LRAD 
projects, often hundreds of thousands of rand. In Paul’s observations, however, 
the reason so many LRAD projects in the district were failing was not only 
because of the complicated co-management scheme with dozens of competing 
interests, but because of the large debt owed to the Land Bank by most 
redistribution farms. In interviews, he rattled off names of failed LRAD projects 
in the area, citing their inability to make a steady income for all the families 
involved while attempting to pay off their debts of hundreds of thousands of rand 
back to the Land Bank. Paul therefore insisted that the Bokdrif project acquire no 
debt whatsoever, and that the farmers refuse to rely on loan funding to get their 
project off the ground.  
This meant a transfer of jurisdiction over the project—from the Land Bank 
to the Provincial Department of Land Affairs—after the group agreed to bypass 
any dealings with the Land Bank. Again, this plan did not align well with the 
Department of Land Affair’s vision for the project, and it was a lengthy and 
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difficult process to convince both the Department and the Land Bank that this 
unorthodox business plan was worthy of their approval. Their reluctance to 
approve this business plan did not lie specifically in the beneficiaries’ refusal of 
loan funding, but in the implications that a smaller budget had for the structure 
and productivity levels of their future LRAD project. The negotiations with these 
two government agencies were long and frustrating enough to warrant political 
action on the part of the Bokdrif farmers. The group protested in front of 
Parliament in Cape Town on numerous occasions, performing South African Toi-
Toi protest dances and demanding that the Land Bank and Department of Land 
Affairs commit to expediting the redistribution process. In retrospect, Bokdrif’s 
efforts to disassociate from the Land Bank were well worth it. Having been 
accused of unnecessarily slow bureaucratic processing and mismanagement of 
funds for many years, the Land Bank was finally subjected to a governmental 
audit in late 2007. The audit revealed that Land Bank officials had embezzled 
over R2-billion that had been allotted for LRAD projects like Georg and Helen’s, 
using the money to “fund their close friends' and associates' ventures,” including 
“luxury golf estates, a sugar mill, equestrian estates and residential developments” 
(Mail & Guardian Online, 6 December 2007).  
 In spite of the Land Bank scandals, the group’s efforts paid off in 
September 2003, when the Department of Land Affairs and the Land Bank finally 
approved the no-debt, low-input business model and the land for their new farm 
was finally transferred to the name of the Bokdrif Trust nearly two years after 
they had started the application process. Unfortunately, this two year time lag 
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from the application to the transfer of the farm represents one of the fastest LRAD 
project transfers committed so far in the Swartland municipality. Despite the fact 
that the farmers now held the title to the land, the property transfer alone was not 
enough for the group to be able to move on to the land to start cultivation. The 
provincial budget for the rest of the year of 2003 had already been spent, so the 
farmers were forced to wait until the new provincial budget approval was made in 
the next year to receive their balance of grants, which was about R350,000 (about 
US $50,000) left over after the purchase of the 31 hectares. Without this money, 
the group could not complete any of the necessary infrastructure development on 
the property, such as building houses, finishing the bore-hole pump and irrigation 
system, and electrifying their parcels, so they remained at ASFA for another year.   
 When the balance of grants was finally paid to the Bokdrif Trust, the 
group finished electrifying the plot, but the irrigation system took nine months to 
even become operational, and was not yet completed as of January 2008. The 
Housing Authority was also very slow in providing funding and materials 
promised for building the farmers’ houses on the property. As a result, Georg and 
Helen did not move onto the property until the latter part of 2004, and his was 
even the first family to move there. They received some housing materials with 
Paul’s help when they did not come quickly enough from the Housing Authority, 
and have also resorted to dwelling inside government provided ‘storage sheds’, 
which are meant for storing harvested vegetables. The Swartland Municipality has 
also thus far failed to come through on its promise to provide plumbing 
infrastructure, so the families still share outhouses. The Municipality has tried to 
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shirk responsibility for the plumbing infrastructure by arguing that the Housing 
Authority should be financially responsible for it, as the plumbing systems they 
need should be inside of the houses. Alternatively, a spokesperson from the 
Department of Environmental Health and Safety told me that she was trying to get 
the Bokdrif farmers some grant money from governmental funds that provide for 
housing improvements for farm workers. She believes that since the government 
provides money for farm workers, they should also provide for the Bokdrif 
farmers because they are former farm workers struggling on their own farm now. 
She remains unsure as to where the plumbing money will come from in the end, 
citing a “severe lack of communication” and “inter-sectoral collaboration” 
between the different departments when it comes to land reform projects.  
 As of January 2008, only five of the eight beneficiary households have re-
located to Bokdrif (Plots 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8—see Table 1)3. Of the other three 
households, two live elsewhere and are charging rent to non-beneficiaries to live 
on and cultivate their plots. One of these plots (Plot 3—see Table 1) is titled to an 
elderly woman, Mrs. Alexander, whose grandson Daniel pays her rent to live and 
farm there while she lives and works in Malmesbury as a dentist’s assistant. The 
other (Plot 7—see Table 1) is titled to a man named Appelgrein who has since 
moved to the Northern Cape to work on another farm that his family owns, and he 
charges his friend Seim from Malmesbury to live on and cultivate his plot. The 
                                                 
3
 Table 1 was compiled by me and is based on my own observations with help from Paul and 
Georg. Paul laid out the format of the different plots and the names of beneficiaries, while Georg 
helped me understand who was actually living at Bokdrif and the circumstances of each plot’s use. 
Georg also told me about the other income sources for the beneficiaries and helped me estimate 
what percentage of their income was earned in farming. The estimated percentages of plots in use, 
cultivars, and livestock categories are based on my observations and information from Georg.  
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remaining plot (Plot 6—see Table 1) is titled to the Frans family, who lives in 
Malmesbury. Though they had aspirations of cultivating some more expensive 
herbs and keeping a few pigs and sheep, they have not made any steps to actualize 
these plans, and their unoccupied plot is used as goat pasture for one of the 
resident beneficiaries who owns Plot 5, Adrian de Water, Senior.  
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Table I: Land Use at Bokdrif             
Beneficiary 
Household*  # Resident? Plot Manager* 
% of 
Plot 
in Use 
Plot Use 
Farming 
as 
% of 
Income 
Other 
Income Cultivars Livestock 
Seppie 1 Yes Seppie 90% 
Vegetable 
cultivation, limited 
livestock forage 
20% 
Manages his 
own electrical 
repairs 
business 
Cabbages, onions, 
green beans, yarrows, 
pepperdews, sweet 
melon 
pigs, 
chickens 
Jansen 2 Yes Jansen 75% 
Vegetable 
cultivation, limited 
livestock forage 
20% 
Owns 
multiple mini-
taxis 
Cabbages, onions, 
green beans, yarrows, 
pepperdews, sweet 
melon 
pigs, 
chickens 
Alexander 3 No 
Daniel, 
grandson of 
beneficiary 
75% 
Vegetable 
cultivation, limited 
livestock forage 
0% 
Works as 
dentist 
assistant in 
Malmesbury 
Cabbages, onions, 
green beans, yarrows, 
pepperdews, sweet 
melon 
pigs, 
chickens 
Georg 4 Yes Georg 80% 
Vegetable 
cultivation, limited 
livestock forage 
20% 
Disability 
pension, lets 
house in 
Malmesbury 
Cabbages, Onions, 
Olives, green beans, 
yarrows, pepperdews, 
sweet melon 
pigs, 
chickens 
de Water, 
Sr. 5 Yes de Water, Sr. 100% Livestock forage 25% 
Railway 
pension none 
goats, 
chickens 
Frans 6 No de Water, Sr. 100% Livestock forage 0% Employed in Malmesbury none none  
Appelgrein 7 No 
Seim, friend 
from 
Malmesbury 
75% 
Vegetable 
cultivation, limited 
livestock forage 
0%** 
Farm in the 
Northern 
Cape 
Cabbages, onion, 
limited vegetables for 
consumption 
chickens 
de Water, 
Jr. 8 Yes de Water, Jr. 20%*** 
Limited vegetable 
cultivation*** 10% 
Employed in 
Malmesbury 
Limited vegetables for 
consumption chickens 
*Names have been changed to protect the anonymity of the beneficiaries      
**Appelgrein lives in the Northern Cape, where he has another farm. I was not able to determine what percentage of his income is from that farm, but 0% of his income was derived from farming at Bokdrif.  
Seim, an acquaintance whom Appelgrein allowed to cultivate the plot, does derive almost all of his income from the farm, and appears to be the least financially secure of any of the Bokdrif residents.  
***The remainder of the de Water, Jr., plot, is occasionally used by de Water, Sr., as forage ground for his goats.    
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De Water’s use of the Frans’ plot is a point of contention between the 
families, as he is not charged rent by the Frans family. Because of this, a number 
of the other beneficiaries believe they should all have equal access to the plot, but 
de Water argues that pasturing his goats requires more land than does vegetable 
cultivation. Though the other beneficiaries know this to be true, they argue in 
return that the beneficiaries were never intended to use livestock as their main 
income generator on such small plots, and that they should all instead cultivate 
vegetables as originally intended in the business plan and for which their training 
at ASFA had prepared them. The problems the rest of the group has had with de 
Water have led them to label him as “headstrong,” “stubborn,” and “difficult,” 
and even Paul reiterated these sentiments. I was, however, unable to hear de 
Water’s opinions on the situation as he was not willing to speak with me. The 
tension between he and the rest of the group was strong enough that the group 
failed to re-elect him as the president of the Bokdrif Trust two years ago when 
they last held elections, choosing Georg as a president instead.  
Despite these problems, the fact remains that none of the rest of the 
farmers are fully cultivating their own plots, and so de Water continues to forage 
his goats on both his plot and the unoccupied plot, which are the only two that are 
being fully utilized. Though they have struck this uneasy balance with de Water, 
the situation may easily form more tensions in the near future as the productive 
capacity of Bokdrif increases, as the five-year business plan intends. That none of 
the other plots are being fully cultivated may stem from the fact that all the 
beneficiaries have other jobs or income sources in addition to farming (see Table 
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1). It remains unclear to me whether the beneficiaries ever intended farming to be 
their only, or even primary, source of income. The only person associated with 
Bokdrif who seems to derive his entire income from farming is Seim, 
Appelgrein’s renter on Plot 7, and he appeared to me to be the least financially 
secure of the entire group.  
Between my lasts visits in 2007 and those in January 2008, there was a 
clear difference in the Paul’s morale with regard to Bokdrif, and he has become 
very critical of the fact that none of the beneficiaries’ are at full cultivation yet. 
Despite the fact that Paul himself was one of the champions of the small-hold 
scheme, it appears he may have had a very different conception of what it would 
materialize as. The number one discrepancy between Paul’s vision for the project 
and that of the beneficiaries seems to be that he had assumed the farmers would 
be using the project as their primary source of income. Additionally, even though 
Paul knew that one of the implications of employing a small-hold model was a 
lower production volume, he had envisioned each of the beneficiaries fully 
cultivating his or her entire plot. It also seems Paul thought they would have a 
more coordinated cultivation plan so that they could pool their produce to tap into 
markets that required higher-volume sales. Thus, Bokdrif was meant to have been 
more of a cooperative arrangement with a unified cultivation scheme—more 
closely resembling the typical large-scale commercial LRAD projects. It is 
important to note here, then, that though Paul advocated for a small-hold project 
model, he did not do so because he thought the large-scale commercial models 
were inherently flawed. Instead, he made this decision primarily so that it would 
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be possible to stay debt-free. It appears that he still hopes Bokdrif will reach full 
productive capacity, with the farmers dedicating almost all of their income-
earning efforts towards their farm.  
In addition to his wish for the farmers to spend more time working on 
cultivation their plots, he expressed specific frustrations that each year the famers 
added an increasing number of items to their ‘wish list’. This wish list is a list of 
farm supplies for which Paul then applies to the government, through the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Program (CASP), for grant money. Though 
the beneficiaries receive many of the items they request, Paul says that most of 
the materials are still either in their original packaging in the piles where they 
were delivered, or are not being utilized as they were intended. For example, most 
of the resident beneficiaries received large water storage tanks in 2005 for 
watering both their livestock and their families, but so far only Seppie has 
installed his. A large amount of fencing material that the group received in 2005 
was never installed and is now nowhere to be found, leading Paul to believe that 
one of the beneficiaries sold it and kept the money for personal use. The Frans 
family received materials for pig housing, but as they have not yet moved to the 
farm to begin working there, those materials are sitting unused on their plot. 
Georg, who has pigs of his own, has requested to use the materials, but the Frans 
family has repeatedly denied his requests. One of the items that Georg received 
from the CASP funding in late 2007 was an expensive vegetable shrink-wrapper, 
which he had deemed absolutely necessary to the profitability of his vegetable 
sales on my last Bokdrif visit of that year. When we spoke again in January 2008, 
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he had had the shrink wrapper for some months, but had discovered too late that 
the supermarkets to which he sold most of his produce were uninterested in 
paying for the value-added on shrink-wrapped (as opposed to “naked”) 
vegetables. Aside from the shrink-wrapper being under-utilized, Paul adds, the 
vegetable scale that Georg received along with the shrink wrapper is not properly 
cared for; he recalls “cringing” at the beneficiaries’ carelessness with the delicate 
instrument.  
Because the members of Bokdrif formed a trust, the land cannot be bought 
or sold yet, but when it is finally able to come up for sale, it must first be offered 
for sale to those in the trust. As of June 2007, it appeared that the families who 
were not yet cultivating the land themselves were willing neither to sell nor to 
begin cultivation, but none of the other Bokdrif members would have had the 
means to buy it if it was put on the market at that point. Upon my last visit in 
January 2008, the tensions both between the resident and non-resident 
beneficiaries and within the farm families at Bokdrif were at their highest yet, 
mirroring Paul’s frustrations. Georg was researching possible loop-holes to the 
trust laws that prevent him and the other beneficiaries from sub-dividing and 
selling their land. He is now expressing wishes to use what money he would get 
from the sale of Bokdrif to start his own, larger commercial operation apart from 
the rules, regulations, and interpersonal tensions of any trust. Despite Bokdrif’s 
choice to employ a individual family plot management scheme to avoid the 
difficulties with co-management, the classification of the whole operation as a 
trust complicates disagreements between the families.  
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 For now, Georg and Helen, along with their grown daughter Anna*, spend 
almost all of their time at Bokdrif, cultivating a variety of vegetables (cabbages, 
onions, green beans, yarrows, sweet potatoes, pepperdews, and watermelon) and 
raising a few pigs and chickens. Georg has also recently been the recipient of one 
hundred free olive trees as the part of the Goedgedacht Trust’s Olive Path Out of 
Poverty Programme (or OP POP, which means ‘pop up’ or ‘pop out’ in 
Afrikaans). The trust received funding from the Dutch Postal Card Lottery to start 
the project, which has community service, public health, and environmental 
protection goals, especially in light of the dire predictions for climatic changes in 
the global south. The Goedgedacht Trust has undertaken research as to what 
options farmers in the Swartland have to prepare their crop regimes for the 
climate change predictions for the Cape (which mostly entail reduced rainfall in 
an already thirsty area). Olive trees use much less water and are hardier than the 
deciduous fruit trees that many farmers in the Western Cape region grow. They 
also have comparatively high returns per hectare when compared to the fruit trees 
and cultivated vegetables.  
Georg’s olive trees are still young and are not bearing fruit yet, but he 
does hope to increase his hectarage in olives to one full hectare (300 more olive 
trees) with the help of Goedgedacht. Before this happens though, the full 
irrigation infrastructure must be completed. Right now each Bokdrif farmer’s plot 
has a drip irrigation system, but it does not cover the entire plot of land. The 
farmers must therefore spend a large amount of time every day simply moving the 
drip irrigation pipes around to water their vegetables. This is difficult for Georg 
                                                 
*
 Names of the project, beneficiaries, and some interviewees (where indicated*) have been changed. 
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because he has had back problems since his days working in the vineyard as a 
child. His back is in bad enough condition that he is considered legally disabled, 
and must go to Malmesbury every two weeks to have his back readjusted, in 
addition to taking an expensive monthly prescription. It is also important to note 
that much of Georg’s income is from a monthly disability pension, which 
represents a larger portion of his income than does farming. He additionally rents 
out a house he owns in Malmesbury, leaving farming (by my estimation) at 
around 20% of his income. 
Though Bokdrif’s support systems are, in many senses, praise-worthy in 
comparison to those of other LRAD projects, it has become clear that many are 
providing patronizing, and not collaborative, support. All who have spent time 
and effort helping Bokdrif succeed have had good intentions, yet some have 
fostered an unhealthy paternalism among the beneficiaries. Paul, for example, has 
never let the farmers themselves in on the grant application process, choosing 
instead to take on all the work himself in fear that they would not write an 
adequate grant. Because of this, the farmers come to expect a certain amount of 
‘free’ grant money every year, and as mentioned earlier, Paul has begun to see 
them as ungrateful.  
In addition to fostering a ‘gift mentality’, the ideology of those involved in 
post-settlement support systems has the power to shape the way the farmers 
themselves view their small-scale production scheme. This is where the 
hegemony of neo-liberalism and modern commercialized agriculture exemplifies 
Robbins’ (2004) Degradation and Marginalization thesis. Even though Bokdrif 
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has managed to evade the government’s overt economic policies that discourage 
small-scale agricultural production, their experience in working with government 
agents and others in the agricultural business is slowly internalizing in them a 
newer, more negative image of small-scale production schemes. Even Paul, for 
example, who spent much of his efforts on securing the small-hold model for the 
beneficiaries, does not necessarily view this as the best farming model. He 
promoted the small-hold model in this case so that no-debt would be acquired, 
and though he views Bokdrif as the most successful LRAD project in the entire 
West Coast District (see Figure 2), it seems that he labels this small-hold model as 
the best that this particular population (coloured former farm workers) can hope 
for. This probably stems from his training in apartheid era institutions, which 
seems to have left him with the mentality that large-scale, white commercial 
farms are the peak of efficiency and progress, while all other models are inferior. 
Thus, though Paul was a champion of the small-hold model for Georg and the rest 
of the beneficiaries, he still judges them against large-scale commercial farms. 
Now, the beneficiaries themselves do not let their own farm escape this scrutiny. I 
think this is why Georg is so eager to subdivide, sell, and start a larger 
commercial farm—even though just a year ago, he was a fierce supporter of their 
group trust structure. 
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Chapter VI  
Results 
 
 This results section is my own analysis, based on my experience with the 
farm and my field work, of how Bokdrif is faring as an LRAD project. I wish here 
to make a clear distinction between Bokdrif as a business entity in general and 
Bokdrif as it compares in the context of other LRAD projects. I aim here to 
compare Bokdrif specifically with more typical, large-scale commercial LRAD 
projects on the basis of economic viability, environmental sustainability, and 
participant satisfaction. It is clear that in comparison to a broader sampling of 
farms in the Western Cape, Bokdrif is probably not as economically viable, and 
may or may not be more environmentally friendly or satisfying to its owners. My 
research, however, is focused on contributing to studies of LRAD projects in 
particular, and judged in that arena, Bokdrif is faring remarkably well; it is easy to 
call Bokdrif a success in that context because the bar for success in LRAD 
projects is so low. Thus, when I use language that describes the ‘successes’ of 
Bokdrif, I wish to make clear that I am defining that success in relative terms. It 
remains evident that there are many improvements to be made on the Bokdrif 
model if it is to inform other potential projects.  
 
i. Business Management 
 
 In this section, I will provide my analysis of the business management 
strategies at Bokdrif, with particular attention to those of Georg. I do not 
endeavour to provide a quantitative economic analysis of his situation, as that is 
outside the scope of my training. I instead reflect more on the soundness of 
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Georg’s business decisions, based on the information available. This analysis is 
also more qualitative in nature, at least partially out of necessity. The type of hard 
numbers I would have needed to provide a more quantitative analysis were, first 
of all, beyond the realm of what I deemed appropriate to ask in an interview. 
Second of all, it did not appear that the farmers at Bokdrif prioritized financial 
bookkeeping (at least for the income that farming at Bokdrif brought them), if 
they kept financial records at all. A sizable share of their business transactions 
were also conducted in more informal markets. I have chosen four categories on 
which to base my business management analysis: cultivation scheme, income, 
costs, and livelihood and food security. Though separated for organization’s sake, 
these categories remain interrelated and successes in any one of the categories 
directly affect the others.  
 
Cultivation Scheme 
In terms of the cultivation plan for Bokdrif, there seems to be 
inconsistency and confusion as to what to plant where, and when, and to whom 
the crops should be sold. There does not appear to be future cultivation plans 
outlined other than those that have been outlined in Georg’s mind. He claims that 
he plants what he thinks he will be able to sell, and has admittedly been wrong 
about his decisions on several occasions. The sense of uncertainty about the 
optimum cultivation scheme is reflected in the physical layout on Georg’s four 
hectares. For example, on one of my visits May of 2007, he was having great 
difficulty finding a market for his crop of sweet potatoes. The sweet potatoes 
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stretched across a large section of his plot, a portion having been harvested, while 
the rest remained in the ground as Georg waited to see where he could sell them. 
Interspersed with the sweet potatoes were yarrows, large stretches of wild 
watermelon laying rotting on the vine, and new onions, while pepperdews and 
sweet green beans were planted haphazardly between patches of what was already 
growing. All of this was just in the section nearest the house, beyond which was a 
larger fallow area that was overgrown with weeds. At the edge of the property 
nearest the road was the new patch of olive trees, which were admittedly being 
given little attention in that important early stage of their life. Even so, he was still 
hoping to receive more olive trees from GARC at that time. I should note that 
although it has been shown that inter-cropping, when conducted properly, is 
beneficial for both soil and harvest yields, the type of cultivation pattern Georg 
was practicing was not an attempt at this strategy. Judging by his accounts, rather, 
his mixed crop cultivation scheme was the result of Georg’s unsuccessful efforts 
to follow unpredictable markets.  
During my visits in January 2008, the cultivation scheme seemed to be 
faring only marginally better than the year before. He was planting primarily 
cabbages and onions after securing a contract with a nearby Pick & Pay 
supermarket (to be discussed in more depth below), along with smaller plots of 
pepperdews, green beans, and yarrows, for which he had no pre-set market. There 
was still a significant area of fallow land. In early 2007, the Department of 
Agriculture announced plans to implement a new nation-wide SMS market 
information system for farmers, in which they could sign up for alerts to price 
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changes for certain crops and livestock. Despite Georg’s initial excitement about 
this when I last spoke to him in 2007, it has not proven particularly helpful, as it 
only tells him what nation-wide price levels are, and does nothing to alert him to 
more specifically local demand which he has the capacity to supply.   
As Paul has stated, it is clear that this small farm, at least in its current 
state, has nowhere near the per hectare production levels of a larger commercial 
farm, and it is clear that a larger commercial farm would have failed long ago if it 
had the type of erratic cultivation scheme that is being used at Bokdrif. The small-
scale of Bokdrif, in this way, has been a blessing, but in others, it has been a 
curse. Local buyers, for example, are not as accustomed to buying in such small 
quantities, and seem generally disinterested in forming any lasting business 
relationships with a small farm that doesn’t have the capacity to supply produce at 
the level the grocery chains are demanding. It seems, instead, that they see 
Bokdrif and other small farms as potential ‘shelf fillers’ of last resort for 
occasions when there is a gap in what their larger, more stable farm partners are 
able to supply. There are informal markets that Georg and some of the other 
farmers have participated in, but they have been neither more stable nor more 
lucrative than trade with larger chains. For example, whole-salers who supply to 
markets in the townships outside of Cape Town occasionally venture northward 
towards Malmesbury, stopping at farms on the way to purchase bulk quantities of 
vegetables. Georg has sold to these buyers on a handful of occasions when he 
could not find another market. These whole-salers paid very low prices because 
they asked for un-cleaned and un-cut vegetables, and because they had to pay to 
  62 
transport bulk shipments of vegetables all the way back to Cape Town. Both Paul, 
and one of the other farmers, Seppie, have called selling to the Cape Town whole-
salers “stupid,” saying that it is usually a decision made in desperation. There are 
also opportunities to sell fresh vegetables on the side of the national highway, the 
N2, that runs in front of Bokdrif. However, because there are other vegetable 
farms on both sides of Bokdrif that also sell produce along the highway, it does 
not seem at this point that road-side sales would provide a significant or 
consistent market for Bokdrif.  
Thus, there have been very few stable business relationships that can help 
inform the Bokdrif farmers what they should cultivate. Moreover, the five-year 
business plan laid out by the PMT was necessarily vague, and has not been useful 
to Georg in making the more specific season-to-season choices that should be 
based on more current market information. It is safe to say that Georg has access 
to neither the market information nor, more importantly, the business contacts that 
he needs to make financially sound cultivation decisions.  
 
Income 
His cultivation scheme is thus based simply on which crops Georg thinks 
he will be able to sell, rather than on adherence to a more inflexible, pre-
determined plan. His main buyers include the Pick & Pay and Spar supermarket 
chains in Malmesbury, who have mostly bought his produce based on customer 
demand, leading to inconsistencies and unpredictable income for Georg. There is 
also a nearby packing and processing plant called Patagonia that buys his produce 
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occasionally. In addition to selling fresh produce, Patagonia makes and sells some 
of its own products, such as sweet chilli sauce, which fetch a higher price than the 
produce. Georg only discovered by accident that he could earn more money this 
way by planting the vegetable ingredients Patagonia needed for their finished 
sauces and other products—hence, his preference for pepperdews. Though he is 
attempting to plant based on market factors, he has not managed to create any 
stable source of income. It is clear, then, why Georg has not come to the point of 
being able to save money yet, as he has intended to do. Even so, he has remained 
somewhat optimistic after receiving the olive trees from the Goedgedacht Trust 
and finally securing a contract with the Pick & Pay supermarket in Malmesbury.  
Bokdrif’s Pick & Pay contract was signed in late 2006, and included three 
of the original beneficiary families, Seppie’s, Jansen’s, and Georg’s, along with 
Mrs. Alexander’s grandson and Seim, the two renters. The contract stipulated that 
these five farm entities supply Pick & Pay with cabbages and onions over three 
years. I did not get a clear answer as to whether there was a certain quota amount 
of onions and cabbages the farmers were obligated to supply. Paul insists that 
there was no set amount at all, and that Pick & Pay was just entering into the 
contract as a publicity stunt. Bokdrif has been receiving a modest amount of 
publicity because of its novelty in the redistribution process, including 
appearances in local newspapers and magazines and an audience with the 
National Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture, Lulu Xingwana. I am 
sceptical, however, that even in light of this publicity, Pick & Pay would not 
require an annual minimum tonnage. Adding to my scepticism is the fact that the 
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farmers had occasionally expressed feeling pressured by Pick & Pay to produce 
more than they were.  
Whether or not there was a produce quota, Pick & Pay was to give the 
farmers the entirety of the contract money, a total of R800,000, as an advance at 
the signing, on which there was no interest. However, at that point, a non-profit 
member of the PMT, the West Coast Ubuntu Farmers’ Union (WEKUFUF), 
stepped in to broker the contract and charge the farmers 8% interest on the Pick & 
Pay advance over the three year period. Georg and Paul were both upset at this, as 
it appeared that WEKUFU had gone behind the farmers’ backs in dealing with the 
Pick & Pay. Pick & Pay then distributed the advance to WEKUFU instead of the 
Bokdrif Trust, and Georg says that though the farm was supposed to have 
received the entirety of the money up front, WEKUFU has been very slow in 
distributing the full amount. At our last meeting, he recounted that he had even 
had to pay for the cabbage and onion plants, on which the contract was based, out 
of his own pocket because WEKUFU had not yet given him the money. He had 
also bought his first pick-up truck after signing the contract, thinking he could 
rely on the advance money to pay for it, but as of June 2007 had not yet been able 
to pick it up yet as he was waiting for the funding. By January 2008, he had his 
pick-up, but remains weary of WEKUFU and their integrity as an organization. 
Bokdrif has still not received the full R800,000, and Georg attributed their 
problems with WEKUFU to difficulties it experienced after the untimely death of 
their director, a friend of Georg’s, who was killed in a car accident shortly before 
the signing of the Pick & Pay contract.  
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The last time we met during my 2007 field work, Georg believed that the 
cultivation of the new olive trees represented great promise, despite the fact that 
the trees would not bear fruit to give the farm a profit for some years (a period 
which will lengthen if the trees are neglected as they have been, although they 
will still bear fruit eventually). It would definitely be a more stable source of 
income, as the Goedgedacht Trust who is helping the farm with project has 
supportive infrastructure set up for small farmers in the area. The Goedgedacht 
Trust is a farm that cultivates many hectares of olives itself, and invested in olive 
processing and packaging equipment. Using this equipment, Goedgedacht is now 
selling olive oil and other olive-based products under its own label and will 
represent a sure buyer of any olives produced by the small farmers in the area. It 
has funding to plant another five hectares of olives every year for free on the land 
of small farmers in the Swartland region, which is part of its initiative to prepare 
farmers for the effects of climate change on their crops.  
The Trust also has a support program in place called the “3C’s”, or climate 
change crops. This program is aimed at finding as many crops as possible that 
small farmers can produce with as little water as possible. In addition, 
Goedgedacht researches which types of crops can be grown well with the olive 
trees in the interim period before they begin bearing marketable olives. They do 
this to ensure that the farmers have some source of income before the olive trees 
can provide any. Goedgedacht will retain control of the aforementioned olive 
processing equipment and thus will inevitably make more money than the farmers 
for the value added in processing, but the organization is committed to re-
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investment in small-hold farms. Hopefully, it will remain consistent in its 
dedication to helping small farmers achieve sustainable livelihoods.  
Despite the potential stability offered by a partner like Goedgedacht, 
Georg, as mentioned earlier, was set on subdividing and selling Bokdrif as soon 
as was legally possible. If this happens as soon as Georg would like, the olive 
trees will not bear fruit in time for him to see whether they would have been a 
viable, steadier income source or not. It seemed that he did not wish to include 
olive trees in the plans he had for his own commercial farm in the future, and 
Goedgedacht would not be willing to provide them to a larger commercial farmer 
if his plans were realized anyway.  
It appears that income from farming thus far at Bokdrif has been 
inconsistent but sufficient, and that the farmers are at least attempting to move 
slowly towards more reliable sources. If some of the other farmers continue on at 
Bokdrif, even if Georg leaves, they would need to focus their efforts on securing 
more stable buyers. For this, they would probably need help from the government, 
possibly in the form of tax breaks for companies who buy LRAD produce. A tax 
break seems an effective possibility in light of the fact that Pick & Pay was 
apparently willing to advance Bokdrif R800,000 without any pre-set contract for 
how much produce they would receive. Because of the scale of operation of 
Bokdrif, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for its income flows to come 
even close to that of larger commercial farm redistribution projects. The reason 
Bokdrif is still running, whereas many other LRAD projects at this stage in their 
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life were failing, appears to be a combination of their reduced costs, discussed in 
the next section, and the farmers’ diverse income sources.  
Though the discussion of income thus far has centered on Bokdrif’s 
farming income, the key point to consider when looking at the farmers’ income is 
that all but one of them have other significant income sources (see Table 1). The 
only person at Bokdrif who does rely solely on agriculture for his income, the 
renter Seim, appears to be the least well-off financially of all the residents. If the 
farmers did not have these other varied income sources, it is difficult to say 
whether they could still afford to continue farming at Bokdrif. At the same time, 
however, perhaps if they did not have to dedicate another portion of their time to 
earning money in other ways, more of their time and energy could have been 
spent in attempts to reach full cultivation at Bokdrif and find new markets for 
their produce.  
Though Paul expresses wishes for the farmers to dedicate more, if not all 
of their time to Bokdrif, it could be argued that this allowance for income 
diversification is one of the strongest points of the small-hold family model. 
Many other LRAD projects in the district were large and labor intensive enough 
to require most of the resident farmers’ time and energy. Though normally only a 
small portion of the beneficiaries are dependent on their farms for income (while 
many of the rest retain outside jobs), the large-scale project represents a more 
narrowly-focused livelihood strategy for those who do depend farm income. In an 
already volatile, unpredictable industry, livelihood diversification may be one of 
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the only realistic ways for LRAD beneficiaries to reduce risks and lessen the 
income shocks typical in the agricultural economy.  
Additionally, if and when larger LRAD farms failed, the farmers were left 
with nothing because they had abandoned their former livelihoods to invest 
themselves in their new projects. In many of these cases, the farmers were worse 
off financially than before they received LRAD grants. If Bokdrif were to fail 
completely, almost all the residents would be able to recover relatively quickly 
from any financial losses they incurred. That said, in Bokdrif’s case many 
government workers would argue, as Paul does, that the project had received far 
too much grant money to exist as a supplementary form of income, rather than a 
primary livelihood. The large amount of government money received, and the 
apparent inefficiency in how the money has been spent, does not seem to justify 
labelling Bokdrif as ‘supplemental’. Though Bokdrif is not an exemplary model 
in fiscal responsibility, I believe other LRAD projects could benefit in an 
allowance for other supplemental activities that would reduce the severity of the 
income shocks that are inevitable in the agricultural market, especially for 
newcomers like LRAD beneficiaries.  
 
Costs  
 The costs incurred by the farmers running Bokdrif so far have been 
particularly low in comparison to other LRAD projects, due at least in part due to 
the large amount of grant money they have been able to secure. Aside from the 
grant support systems Bokdrif has in place, one factor sets it apart from so many 
  69 
other LRAD projects and many farms around the world: it has no debt. This was 
primarily because of Paul’s insistence that ‘no borrowing’ be a stipulation of the 
business management plan, and it has been possible primarily through his and 
Georg’s efforts at finding and taking advantage of government programs that will 
provide funding for whatever costs they sustain. One program in particular, South 
Africa’s Comprehensive Agricultural Support Program (CASP), has been 
especially helpful. Bokdrif received in excess of R600,000 of free grant money 
from this program from 2005-2007, which benefits many small farmers. Under 
this program, the farmers meet with Paul and discuss specific equipment, building 
materials, and implements they need for the year, determine the costs, and write 
an application for funding that details the specific items—this is the ‘wish list’ 
discussed earlier. It is this money that has funded the irrigation system (so the 
farmers will not have to move the drip irrigation pipes daily), the construction of 
vegetable shade houses, shelters for the pigs, fencing, the un-used vegetable 
packaging equipment discussed earlier, and various gardening tools, among 
others. It remains to be seen how long the farmers will be able to take advantage 
of this program, as the funding for it has been drastically cut in recent years. It is 
funded on a provincial basis, and the Western Cape’s budget dropped from R75 
million in 2005 to R33 million in 2007. 
 The cost of large implements is one factor that has been a problem for 
Bokdrif, as they have not been able to afford all the equipment they need to 
become the small commercial enterprise they are aspiring to be. They currently 
need to borrow almost all large equipment (tractors, ploughs and disc ploughs, 
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rakes, etc) from the Goedgedacht Trust, and Georg remains uneasy about the 
farms dependency on implements that belong to someone else. He hopes that with 
moneys from the CASP application next year (this year’s money has largely 
already been spent on the above mentioned items) and the Pick & Pay contract, 
the farm will someday be able to afford their own equipment. This would reduce 
their dependency both on Goedgedacht and on hiring temporary labourers. Three 
to five temporary workers are needed to complete tasks over several days that 
Georg could complete in one day by himself if he had the right equipment.  
Right now, it is difficult for Georg to afford hired labourers to help with 
farm tasks even for busy times, so it remains to be seen how long it will actually 
take to save up the kind of money needed to buy expensive implements like 
tractors. Still, the cost of family labour is ‘free’, and Georg, Helen, and their 
daughter all work the farm. Other input costs are less concerning: the cost of 
seeds is relatively inexpensive and easily covered by the farmers, and they do not 
use enough chemicals for them to constitute a large operational cost (and these are 
often paid for with CASP money). They also get fertilizer for very cheap, and 
sometimes at no cost at all, from the neighbouring chicken farm. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the Bokdrif Trust was only able to attain a less-productive 
parcel of land from a larger white farm. Because their land is less productive, they 
do need a significant amount of fertilizer to maintain healthy vegetables.  
This is one instance where Bokdrif’s small scale is both good and bad for 
cost minimization. Because Bokdrif is a small-scale farm, the nearby chicken 
farm all but donates for what would be a significant cost to the farmers, whereas 
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they charge one of the larger farms down the road much more for their manure. 
Additionally, the Bokdrif farmers apply the manure ‘manually’, with shovels and 
wheelbarrows, allowing them to be more discriminating about where they apply 
the fertilizer. This reduces the amount of ‘per-crop’ manure they need to fertilize 
relative to a larger, more mechanized operation with the same cultivation scheme. 
Therefore, Bokdrif’s fertilizer costs are reduced both because of the smaller per-
crop volume they need and because of the chicken farm’s benevolence to its 
smaller-scale neighbors. One could also argue, however, that the time costs of 
manually applying the fertilizer make up for the reduced monetary costs of 
fertilizer for the Bokdrif farmers. Based on the economics of family farms and the 
advantage of family labor exploitation, I would say that Bokdrif still has a cost 
advantage over larger-scale operations in terms of fertilizer costs. Their smaller 
scale, then, allows them to keep costs of fertilizer down even on less productive 
land. It is important to note, however, that if Bokdrif did begin to operate at a 
larger scale, the fact that they have less fertile land to begin with would quickly 
turn into a disadvantage.  
Beyond the cost of fertilizer, one payment that has been difficult for the 
farmers to pay has been the electricity bill to Eskom, which is R150 per month per 
family. It seems to be more the rigidity of the amount and the day that it is due 
that is the real problem, as the farmers’ incomes are highly variable and 
dependent on seasons, weather, and markets that electricity bills do not heed. The 
R150 monthly amount was written into the Trust’s laws at its inception, yet there 
is still debate over why each group should have to pay this. Here again, there is 
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tension between Adrian de Water, Senior, and the rest of group, as Mr. de Water 
claims he uses less energy and that the payments they make should be 
proportional and not a pre-set amount.   
 Where the Bokdrif farmers may have difficulty paying R150 a month in 
electricity bills, beneficiaries of a large-scale commercial redistribution project 
would have been faced with significantly higher costs. This is primarily because 
of the debt they almost necessarily incur in their purchase of the implements and 
inputs necessary to run a successful large farming operation. Even in cases where 
commercial redistribution projects in the Malmesbury area experienced a larger 
flow of income, Paul says, the proportion of income they dedicated to paying the 
operational costs and interest on debt was clearly much higher than they could 
afford to keep up with—or even to survive. The fact that Bokdrif is both surviving 
and even slowly expanding suggests that the costs of this small-hold operation are 
much more manageable.  
 
Livelihood and food security 
 With all the support mechanisms in place, the fact that they have no debt, 
their full ownership of the land, their steadier income from non-farming sources, 
and their relatively low cost of living, Georg and Helen seem very secure in their 
livelihood, increasingly so as they learn more about predicting and cultivating for 
specific markets. As discussed earlier, other income sources make a larger 
contribution to the beneficiaries’ income, but owning their own land can be seen 
as an additional measure of securing the families’ economic futures. None of the 
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families appear to be struggling with food security (as this could be a source of 
embarrassment it would be understandable if the situation were otherwise and the 
farmers did not want me to know about it, but I think this is unlikely). With the 
high rate of failure experienced on the large scale commercial projects in the area, 
it is difficult to see how those participants could have been more secure in their 
livelihoods. At first glance, it may seem that Georg’s wish to sell his plot would 
suggest a defeat for the project, and while this is true in some sense, this is a very 
different ‘defeat’ than that experienced by most other LRAD projects. Many other 
projects that fail are completely liquidated and leave the beneficiaries with little or 
no assets. In Bokdrif’s case, Georg is looking to use what he’s saved from his 
LRAD project and expand on it, working to develop his farming abilities rather 
than get out of the business altogether. Whether this is a wise economic decision 
or not, it does at least indicate that he has more financial security than most other 
LRAD beneficiaries in South Africa.  
 
ii. Environmental Management 
 In this section, I discuss the environmental impacts that Bokdrif has and 
draw some comparisons between Bokdrif’s impact and that of more conventional 
LRAD projects. Again, it was outside the scope of my project to conduct in-depth 
quantitative studies; even if the kind of data I would need for a quantitative 
analysis of Bokdrif’s chemical usage, soil health, and water and energy 
consumption were readily available, there have been no published studies that I 
am aware of addressing the environmental impacts of LRAD projects (see Rippon 
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& Meadows, unpublished, 2006). Instead, as in the last section, I provide a more 
qualitative analysis of decisions that have been made at Bokdrif with regard to 
four categories: soil, chemical use, water, and energy consumption. 
 
Soil 
 The soil at Bokdrif is very sandy, a soil type classified by the South 
African Soil Classification System (SASCS) as Fernwood, which is comparable 
to the Entisol soil type of USDA Soil Taxonomy system (INCO-DC, 1999). 
Entisols are often described as soils with no horizontal profile development 
evident, and when found in dry, hot, sandy areas, they can have a high infiltration 
rate (meaning that water is unlikely to runoff the surface of the soil). These soils 
are moderately well-suited for growing the vegetables that Georg and the others 
have selected (the sweet potatoes, onion, yarrow, and cabbage are best-suited, but 
all are growing fine there). Before the farmers bought that section of what was 
once a larger farm, the previous owner mined the sand from that section, leaving a 
relatively thin layer of topsoil that was not particularly fertile.  
The sandiness of the soil makes it well-drained, the land is relatively flat, 
and there are rarely excessive amounts of rainfall in the area—all of which mean 
that the potential for erosion is very low. In addition, the fact that fewer plants 
would grow on the soil if the farmers did not plant them means that the soil now 
has more plant roots to hold it down. The soil’s sandiness, however, does make 
leaching a problem, as nutrients tend to sink below levels where plants roots can 
effectively use them. The chicken farm and broiler houses in the farm adjacent to 
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Bokdrif are convenient, giving the farmers a cheap and easy way to replace these 
leached nutrients. The chicken manure contains nitrogen, first and foremost, but 
also has helpful trace elements such as copper, zinc, manganese, and boron. 
Because it is applied by the individual farmer rather than a larger machine, it is 
used more sparingly than would be done on a larger more mechanized farm, 
meaning there is less potential to over-fertilize (which often contributes to 
eutrophication in nearby streams, rivers, or lakes—but because there is so little 
runoff this would be less of a problem at Bokdrif anyway). There is also 
something to be said for the fact that they are not using more harmful synthetic 
fertilizer, but are instead using a nearby source of nutrients (in the form of 
chicken manure) that would be going to waste otherwise.  
 
Water 
 Water is the biggest environmental risk factor for farmers in the Western 
Cape, according to Paul. The region has a Mediterranean-like climate, with winter 
rain fall (May-August) and very dry, hot summers (November-February). The 
Western Cape’s annual precipitation is only 348 millimeters, and it has the most 
variability between annual averages of any other South African Province 
(ENPAT, 2001). There is little availability of underground artesian wells and 
aquifers, and there are few bodies of water from which to draw for cultivation. 
Bokdrif is lucky in that it is situated atop an artesian well that is as yet 
uncontaminated. The farmers applied to the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry to extract 63 cubic meters per hectare on 7 hectares of land (they applied 
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for only seven hectares, because as previously mentioned, none of the plots are 
near under full cultivation). Their application was approved, and they have 
consistently been extracting the maximum amount. This is troubling, because as 
Paul reports, 63 cubic meters is no less water than would be used per hectare on a 
large commercial farm. It remains a mystery where the water is being consumed, 
as Bokdrif is producing so much less per hectare than a large-scale commercial 
farm.  
Paul says that he doesn’t understand Bokdrif’s water consumption levels, 
while Georg argues that the farmers need every bit of water they are extracting. 
Georg has complained that the larger farm across the road, which shares the same 
small aquifer, consistently withdraws more than its water permit allows. Perhaps 
Bokdrif’s withdrawal levels are a knee-jerk reaction to their neighbors’ 
overconsumption, leading them to withdraw as much as they can in fear that they 
will be missing out if they do not extract as much as they possibly can before their 
neighbors use up their shared supply. Another possible explanation for their high 
water use levels is that their already sandy soil had been mined by the former 
owner, leaving them with high infiltration rates. This would mean that the water 
they do give their crops drains more quickly to a level below which the plants 
utilize.  
At this point it is important to reiterate that market-led agrarian reform 
(MLAR) proponents, as previously discussed, have argued that state-led reform 
will lead beneficiaries to receive marginal land. In the case of Bokdrif, however, 
the MLAR system was what led the beneficiaries to receive marginal land, as 
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their plot is a less desirable—but more affordable—plot of land that a more 
successful white farmer no longer wanted. This, in turn, may be affecting both the 
financial viability of Bokdrif—in that they need to buy more inputs to make their 
soil productive—and the environmental sustainability—in that their soils have 
higher infiltration rates and they use more water than they would otherwise need 
to. This represents a major environmental problem, then, because Bokdrif has 
access to sufficient water supplies where many other farms do not, and is 
producing less per hectare than other farms while using just as much water. As 
water is one of the most precious resources in the Western Cape, this is a problem 
that Bokdrif needs to address.  
 
Chemical Use 
The use of chemicals on the farm is very low compared to a larger 
commercial farm, as Georg uses only two insecticides (no herbicides or 
fungicides are necessary): cypermethrin and deltamethrin. He applies these by 
hand with a rudimentary hand-held bag sprayer, which is one of the main reasons 
he uses so much less than a large farm that would spray by machine. At least part 
of the reason that only these two chemicals are used is that South African farmers 
are finding their products unmarketable to European markets unless they comply 
with “Europgap,” the regulations for chemical usage standards put out by the 
European Union. Although Paul claims that these two insecticides are not harmful 
to humans at all, do not cause cancer or any other adverse health effects, and do 
not contaminate groundwater, my own investigations have proven otherwise. The 
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EPA has labelled all pyrethrins (the chemical group that both cypermethrin and 
deltamethrin fall under) as having at least moderate potentiality as carcinogens, 
and also found that it is highly toxic to aquatic animals. It is also suspected that 
this family of chemicals are endocrine disruptors, which often has consequences 
for reproductive systems of both animals and humans (EPA, 1998). This makes 
the fact that the farmers at Bokdrif are aspiring to become more commercialized 
and employ mechanized spray systems problematic.  
 
Energy Consumption 
 Energy consumption, both in terms of electricity consumed and fossil 
fuels burned, is significantly lower at Bokdrif than it would be on a large scale 
commercial farm. In the case of electricity, this is because there is really not any 
infrastructure at Bokdrif that is even capable of consuming large amounts of 
electricity, as evidenced by the fact that the farm only has a 50 Rva system. Their 
biggest factor in electricity consumption is the electrified water pumping system; 
household uses are negligible. They also clearly use less fossil fuels than would a 
large farm because they do not have the equipment, and instead rely far more on 
expending human energy (in terms of hiring farm workers instead of mechanizing 
the same task) than on fossil fuel energy. Again, however, the farmers, if at all 
possible and when they can afford to, will become more mechanized as soon as 
they can. This will make their fossil fuel consumption patterns increasingly 
similar to those on large-scale commercial ventures.  
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iii. Participant Satisfaction 
 Though this part of my analysis is far from being objective or quantifiable, 
it remains one of the most important to the success of the project. I have 
attempted simply to relay what the farmers have expressed to me and give 
reflections on my observations of the farm.  
 It seems clear that the farmers are materially less well-off than they were 
while they lived together at the Atlantic Small Farmers Association. Georg and 
Helen both spoke nostalgically of the comfortable accommodations and the 
conveniences that were available to them while they lived there. The simple fact 
that three of the families have not yet moved to Bokdrif and do not intend to is 
evidence enough that the material conditions elsewhere are more favourable. 
Bokdrif has yet to receive many of the materials promised by the Department of 
Housing (hence, their resorting to dwell in vegetable storage containers) and has 
not yet received funding or support services to put in plumbing systems on the 
farm (the responsibility of the Swartland Municipality).  
Though Helen was one of the main informants for my project, this case 
study is clearly biased towards Georg’s point of view because he was the primary 
decision-maker on matters dealing with Bokdrif. Helen’s account provided mostly 
background information, and therefore even in the re-telling of the story of the 
project to which she has dedicated all her efforts in the past few years, she seems 
a peripheral figure. This in itself reveals much about the power dynamics of 
Georg and Helen’s relationship. Perhaps it is this clear lack of decision-making 
power that made Helen the more likely of the two to express dissatisfaction with 
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the project and their new lives there. Although both Georg and Helen have 
expressed concerns about the current state of Bokdrif, Helen seems to have found 
the transition more fraught with difficulty than Georg has. For example, while 
Georg has more access to better farming equipment for the work that he does 
fulfilling his ‘role’ as husband and provider, Helen has less access to the 
conveniences that made her ‘role’ as a wife and mother much easier at Atlantis. 
She also seems more distressed that her two sons had no interest in living with 
them on a farm, as they had grown up in town and wished to stay there. It also 
seems clear to me that their daughter would move to town if she could, but has 
nowhere to go and a child to support, and needs the help of her parents. It seems 
safe to say that Helen does not have much decision making power in the 
relationship, as evidenced by her constant reference to the fact that she loves her 
husband and must follow where he goes when asked what she would like to do 
instead. Despite these concerns of Helen’s, she has expressed in genuine terms 
that she does love living away from the city and feels very proud of the fact that 
she and Georg own their own farm now.  
If Helen speaks in glowing terms of farm life, Georg nearly bursts with 
excitement when the subject comes up. He attributes what success he has had with 
the project to the fact that he has a born passion for farming—“You must be born 
a farmer, you can’t make a farmer. It must be inside you,” he says. “But once it’s 
inside you, you can’t take it out.” By all his accounts, he is pleased with what he’s 
achieved so far, even if he realizes that there is still much work to be done. He is 
deeply proud of his achievement in getting this farm of his own, and very happy 
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to give advice to any other potential LRAD grant recipients who come around—
which is a lot, considering the relative fame this project has brought him. Because 
this project is one of the first of its kind, it has become a bit of a ‘poster-child’ for 
land redistribution in the Western Cape, scoring Georg appearances in 
newspapers and magazines, and an audience with the new National Minister of 
Agriculture, Lulu Xingwana. It is ironic that the government at the provincial 
level, on one hand, made it so difficult for the beneficiaries to participate in a 
small-hold project, yet the government at the national level is holding up Bokdrif 
as a an innovative new method they are using to address problems with the LRAD 
process. It seems that though the government is using Bokdrif as a ‘feel good’ 
story to promote their efforts to improve the LRAD system, they are not whole-
heartedly behind the concept of small-hold redistribution projects.  
Though it is clear that Georg is proud of his accomplishments at Bokdrif, 
the fact remains that he aspires to sell it and move onto a bigger, more financially 
lucrative commercial farm as soon as he can. His dissatisfaction in the project 
appears to be located in the group dynamic, and in particular, with Mr. de Water. 
The biggest problem Georg has with Bokdrif is that he does not have full power 
to make his own business decisions, even with the individually-owned plot model. 
I believe that his dissatisfaction is greater than the rest of the farmers’ in this 
arena, possibly because he is the president of the trust and is responsible for 
making decisions that affect the group, and is therefore the person most open to 
criticism by the other farmers. Another element of what dissatisfaction he has 
with project stems from his wishes that Bokdrif would be more lucrative. Here, it 
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seems that Moseley’s (2007) assertion that many LRAD beneficiaries have 
unrealistic expectations for profit levels stemming from their impressions of 
agriculture during apartheid’s protectionist era is very applicable. To Moseley’s 
point, I would add that in addition to expectations of more profitable ventures, the 
LRAD beneficiaries have high expectations in terms of simply being able to break 
into the network of their white counterparts, when in reality, this is much more 
difficult than they predict it will be and than the South African government would 
probably like to admit.  
Despite what problems the farmers have with Bokdrif, and the tensions 
between the members, they are faring far better than most other LRAD projects 
would normally be at this point in their project’s history (see Table II for full 
comparison between Bokdrif and other LRAD projects). Even in January 2008, 
when, as mentioned earlier, tensions within the group were at their highest that I 
witnessed, Paul still labelled Bokdrif as the most successful LRAD project the 
district had ever seen, and all the resident participants except Georg were still 
clearly tied to the work they had done, and expressed plans to stay at Bokdrif. 
That, in itself, puts Bokdrif in a better place than other LRAD projects, even if it 
does not represent the ‘perfect’ LRAD model.  
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Table II: Categories for Analysis
Broad Category Sub-Categories How does Bokdrif compare? 
Economic 
Sustainabiltiy a. Cultivation Scheme
Erratic cultivation scheme shows less knowledge of and 
access to markets than a larger commercial LRAD 
project
b. Income Sources
More diverse than those of residents at a typical LRAD 
project; almost none of the residents makes more than 
25% of his or her income from farming
c. Costs
Much lower than a typical LRAD project because of no-
debt model and additional CASP grant money, their 
biggest fixed cost is a monthly energy bill
d. Livelihood Security 
More secure than the typical LRAD project because they 
have risked less by not acquiring debt and are able to 
dedicate time to other income-earning activities
Environmental 
Sustainability a. Soil Health
Soils poorer than most commercial farms, but they apply 
natural fertilizer manually, thus reducing the risks 
associated with both synthetic fertilizers and runoff from 
overfertilization
b. Water Consumption
Uses just as much water per hectare as a large-scale 
farm while producing less, may stem from soil's high 
infiltration rate or competition with farm across the road
c. Energy Consumption
Negligible in comparison to typical LRAD project, but 
intentions to expand in future will require much greater 
energy use
d. Chemical Use
Much lower than a typical LRAD project because their 
small-scale allows more sparing manual application of 
less toxic pesticides, although these still pose health risks 
for people and animals
Participant 
Satisfaction
My interpretation of Georg and 
Helen's feelings about the project 
Bokdrif is faring much better than a typical LRAD project 
in this category, even though there have been group 
tensions and Georg wishes to subdivide and sell his plot
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Chapter VII 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
Reviewing this case study and its particularities has been informative for 
the broader body of literature on land reform in South Africa. First of all, this case 
shows that contrary to market-led agrarian reform (MLAR) proponents’ argument 
that state-led reform leads beneficiaries to receive marginal land, the opposite is 
true: the MLAR system is what let these beneficiaries to receive marginal land.  
South Africa’s MLAR system dictated that best possible plot available at an 
affordable price to Bokdrif’s beneficiaries was a smaller, less-productive corner 
of a white owned farm whose top-soil had been mined. This has important 
implications for the future structure of land reform programs in South Africa. It 
implies that beneficiaries could have access to better plots if the state took a more 
authoritative position to securing productive land for LRAD projects. Already, 
under the relatively new National Agricultural Minister Lulu Xingwana, the South 
African state has begun expropriation of land for the land reform program within 
the last year. Hopefully this will have a positive effect on the successes of LRAD 
projects in the future.  
On the other hand, giving the state more responsibility on paper may lead 
to an even more difficult, bureaucratic land reform process overall, because Hall’s 
(2004) problem of ‘big policy and the shrinking state’ is evident in this case 
study. The beneficiaries’ experience illustrates the tremendous amount of 
bureaucratic layers (‘big policy’) one must traverse to participate in the land 
reform program in South Africa, even while there were instances where it was 
clear that the different governmental departments involved were too under-funded 
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and over-worked (‘shrinking state’) to enforce these contracts and laws. In 
Bokdrif’s case, this is evident in their ‘battle’ with the Provincial Department of 
Road Affairs to get approval for an access road. Additionally, there was a lack of 
communication between the different governmental departments who ‘touched’ 
Bokdrif, and occasionally their different policies were contradictory. This is 
exemplified in the confusion as to which governmental department was 
responsible for funding for Bokdrif’s plumbing systems. Perhaps this lack of 
communication and collaboration between the different branches of government 
stems from what Bryant and Bailey (1997) label as the ‘functionally-defined 
state’. Functionally-defined states, like South Africa, divide the government into 
different resource management departments (eg, Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, Department of Land Affairs, Department of Minerals and Energy). With 
each branch of government focused specifically on managing their particular 
resource, it is very difficult to create a unified strategy for LRAD projects, whose 
success depend on careful management of multiple categories of resources that 
refuse to fit neatly under the jurisdiction of one governmental department.   
In addition to the policy contradictions between different governmental 
branches, there is an inherent contradiction in the roles of the state itself—again, 
Bryant and Bailey (1997) are helpful with their analysis of the ‘dual role of the 
state’. They argue that the state’s responsibility to protect its most vulnerable 
populations and resources is perverted by aspirations of developing a globally 
competitive market economy. In Bokdrif’s case, this is clear in the paradox of the 
government holding Bokdrif up as a poster-child LRAD project while 
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simultaneously having discouraged their small-hold model to begin with. On the 
one hand, the social development side of the state champions a more socially 
contextualized small-hold, family farming model as better for the project 
participants; on the other hand, the neo-liberal state discourages a less productive 
small-hold project model as economically inefficient and bad for the economy. It 
seems that, with Georg’s wishes to have a more productive, large-scale farm, even 
he has internalized in him an increasingly negative view of the small-hold model 
that seems to originate in the neo-liberal state’s unwavering emphasis on high-
input, high-output farming models. Again, this internalization of the government’s 
neo-liberal development strategies can be seen as an instance of Robbins’ (2004) 
Degradation and Marginalization thesis—where state development intervention 
compromises the environmental sustainability, and thus, the economic 
sustainability, of local production systems. Though the small-hold model is shown 
in this case to be more environmentally innocuous overall than typical LRAD 
projects and represents a more economically secure livelihood, it does not fit into 
the state’s neo-liberal economic development strategies that measure success 
based on national-level macroeconomic indicators.  
Finally, this case contributes to Hall’s (2004) arguments that the LRAD 
program is failing because it fails to address agrarian dualism in the countryside. 
She argues that the overall binary structure of agricultural systems in South 
Africa—the modern, capital intensive side that is subsidized by cheap labor from 
the more traditional production systems—is not being targeted by LRAD policies. 
Instead, the LRAD program is simply attempting to create an elite class of black 
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commercial farmers without restructuring this problematic dualism. The struggles 
of the Bokdrif beneficiaries to have their small-hold model approved by the state 
shows clearly that the state is focusing on creating large-scale, commercial LRAD 
projects. Even though the state finally did approve the small-hold model scheme, 
the Bokdrif farmers are being pushed by government discourse, by the structure 
of the markets that they have not yet been able to break into, and even by Paul, to 
boost productivity levels and to increasingly resemble a large-scale commercial 
farm. Thus, even these small-hold model project beneficiaries, that have proven 
their project to be more successful overall than the typical large-scale commercial 
models, are being pressured to move away from their original structure and to 
become part of this class of elite black commercial farmers.  
In terms of refining policy recommendations from these conclusions, it 
would be unreasonable to attempt to generalize or make broad value statements 
concerning all small-hold and all large-scale commercial farms after having 
examined only one small-hold model. There can be no clear-cut answer as to 
whether the small-hold model is in all cases better or worse, because the success 
of the project depends very much on all the different contexts in which it is 
created. There have been large-scale commercial operations that succeed, and 
there are aspects of even this well-supported, well-funded small-hold project that 
are not faring well.  
 After discussing the project’s strong points and shortcomings, it seems 
clear that there are five very important factors in the relative success of this 
project when compared to other LRAD projects. The first is that it had no debt, 
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which plays an enormous role in the financial viability of the farm. As the Land 
Bank has recently become so embroiled in scandal and corruption, now seems as 
opportune a time as any for the government to de-emphasize agricultural lending 
for LRAD projects. Though it does not seem feasible to stipulate that LRAD 
projects receive no loan money, I would recommend that other LRAD projects, 
like Bokdrif, do as much as possible to research grants and other support systems 
that provide ‘free’ money, rather than borrowing from credit institutions. This 
may be increasingly difficult as government budgets are cut, as evidenced by the 
CASP programs funding shortages of late. However, if LRAD applicants steer 
clear of large-scale commercial models that require so much more start-up capital, 
it is much more plausible that other groups could follow in Bokdrif’s ‘no-debt’ 
footsteps.  
The second factor of Bokdrif’s relative success is the amount of support 
systems it has in place, in terms of both finances and infrastructure, and simply 
people who are invested in the success of the project. This justifies the findings of 
numerous authors who cite the lack of post-settlement support as one of the 
primary points at which many LRAD projects fail (such as Zimmerman, 2000; 
Mather, 2002; Cousins, 2005; Moseley, 2007). Without the support of financial 
mechanisms like CASP, organizations like the Goedgedacht Trust, and people 
like Paul (who admits that the Bokdrif farm is the project that is the “closest to 
[his] heart” of all he worked with so far), it would be infinitely more difficult for 
Bokdrif to have succeeded to the point it has. Because of the publicity Bokdrif has 
had, it is difficult to say if other projects would be able to secure as much support 
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as they have, and it would be misleading to assert that their success in this arena is 
something that all small-hold LRAD projects could attain if they become more 
common.  
Still, one aspect of Bokdrif that has worked greatly to their advantage was 
collaboration with NGOs like Goedgedacht, rather than strict reliance on 
government support systems. South African government departments, in most 
cases, are under-resourced and have not exhibited the ability to provide the full 
extent of services a fledgling LRAD project requires. Local NGOs provide 
another potential support mechanism for such projects. Further research should be 
conducted as to the possible roles NGOs could fill in relation to land reform in 
South Africa, and into the logistics of NGOs potential relationships with 
government agencies in assisting with LRAD projects. In light of the 
government’s shortcomings in its land reform programs so far, should NGOs be 
considered a part of the national land reform program? How can their work be 
incorporated into or encouraged by national-level land reform policies? These are 
just a handful of the many questions that could be researched, and I believe the 
NGO community holds great potential for improving the LRAD project success 
rates in South Africa.   
The third important factor in Bokdrif’s operations is the individual 
household management scheme. Although there have been arguments between the 
households at Bokdrif, they have not had as much of a negative impact on 
business decisions on the farm as they would have if there were a joint 
management scheme. One recommendation I would have as to how to improve 
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the group dynamic in future small-hold model LRAD projects would be to add a 
required group constitution in addition to the business management plan. Many of 
the problems between the households at Bokdrif could have been fairly resolved if 
there had been a pre-set list of rules regarding use rights, group expenses, and 
resource use. Though Bokdrif does have a constitution, it outlines little but the 
process of electing a new board president. The group would have benefited 
greatly from a more in-depth constitution, and it seems that other LRAD projects 
would do the same. Here, for example, lies an opportunity for NGO involvement 
in the LRAD process. An NGO in Cape Town, the Legal Resources Center 
(LRC), has a land reform sub-branch that has helped more recently emerging 
LRAD projects draft constitutions that are legally binding. I paid a visit to one 
such project that was showing at least as much promise, if not more, than Bokdrif, 
in large part thanks to the help they had received from the LRC and other local 
NGOs. Beneficiaries there had a much clearer picture of their role within the 
larger project, and at least from my superficial examination, their operations 
appeared to be running with far fewer conflicts than Bokdrif.  
The fourth important factor in Bokdrif’s relative success is the fact that the 
small-hold scheme allows the farmers enough time and energy to continue to earn 
income in other ways, which, in effect, subsidizes their farming operation. 
Despite the fact that they are not at full cultivation capacity yet, the farmers are 
financially stable and are slowly working towards full capacity. This would 
suggest that LRAD projects could benefit if the government allowed for a more 
gradual ‘transitional model’ business plan, rather than attempting to reach full 
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productive capacity in as short a time period as possible. A transitional model 
business plan would allow for beneficiaries to retain other means of income while 
building up their farms, and should a beneficiary, such as Georg, wish to expand 
capacity further, he or she would have the agricultural base and financial stability 
to do so. Here again, however, as Robbins (2004) might argue, the hegemony of 
national-level neo-liberal economic policies that push for maximum production 
could easily prevent the realization of a more locally contextualized solution for 
LRAD beneficiaries. 
The final crucial factor is the determination and ambition of the farmers. 
In this project in particular, the amount of hard work put in by Georg is 
noteworthy. Paul admits that he would have nowhere near as much will to help 
Bokdrif so much if he was not so inspired by all the work Georg put in himself. It 
is clear, though, that Georg has had much more agricultural training than have 
most other LRAD applicants, received during his days at ASFA. This draws 
contentious questions in terms of trends in South African land reform thus far—is 
the land reform program as it stands effective at recruiting ‘the right type of 
applicants’? What are the merit and qualifications, both professional and personal, 
of potentially successful applicants? Could the government possibly 
operationalize a ‘recruitment’ strategy to improve the success of land reform 
projects, and what are the ethical implications of such a strategy? Currently, the 
LRAD process seems to discriminate against the poor in its reward for up-front 
financial contributions.  In light of the fact that there must be some discrimination 
in who does and does not receive LRAD money simply by virtue of the fact that 
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there is not enough to go around, what factors could the government use, instead 
of the applicants’ finances, to decide who is awarded grants? These are very 
difficult questions to grapple with, and are deserving of careful research and 
consideration.  
 As a model, small-hold farms hold great potential for the land 
redistribution program in the Western Cape. Although there are not many in 
existence from which to draw data, it appears after examining Bokdrif that there 
are many aspects of this type of management model that would suit some grant 
applicants better than a large-scale commercial endeavour. More research, 
perhaps more quantitative research than my study can provide, will be valuable to 
the discussion on the viability of the projects. What can be determined from my 
research is that small-hold projects can be successful, that they represent 
opportunities for livelihood security for rural populations, and that they can be a 
great source of pride for those who work on them. It is very clear, however, that 
the government and other support mechanisms play a crucial role in the success of 
any redistribution project. Hopefully with more research, new alternative small-
hold models for land reform can begin to help South Africa towards reaching its 
land redistribution goals in the name of poverty alleviation and giving justice to 
marginalized South Africans.  
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